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Article 3

Wesley: The Collapse of the Confederacy

The Collapse of the Confederacy
By Charles H. W esley,
Associate Professor of History.

T is customary to account for the collapse of the Confederacy in the
War, 18(11-181)5, on the basis of the preponderant resources in men
and materials, and through the superior military, financial and industrial
organizations of the North .1 It has been asserted that the Confederacy
might have continued the contest hut for the superior organization of the
Northern Armies, as shown in Grant’s Campaign in Virginia, Thomas’s
victories in Tennessee, Sheridan's devastation *in the Shenandoah, Sher
man’s march through Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina, and the
blockade. The resources of the two sections have been compared, statistics
of the wealth and population have been used to show the superiority of the
northern section. Finally, this rather traditional treatment of the War
has ended with the astonishing conclusion that we must all he amazed that
the Confederacy was able to continue the contest for so long a period.
On the contrary, it is astonishing that, with its resources, the Confederacy
did not continue the War for a longer period, llere was a nation with a
large territory and enormous resources suddenly collapsing. Flow is it to

I

* In the preparation and completion of this study, I am under deep obligations to
Professor Edward Channing, who has directed and encouraged my efforts in this
field of research. The materials upon which the Monograph is based were used
in the presentation of the investigation as a Seminary study at Harvard University.
1 Judge Graham Taylor, quoting Charles Francis Adams, on the occasion of the
celebration of the birth of General Robert E. Lee, made the following statements:
“How was the wholly unexpected outcome brought about? The simple answer is,
the Confederacy collapsed from inanition. Suffering such occasional reverses and
defeats as are incidental to all warfare, it was never crushed in battle or on the field
until its strength was sapped away from want of food. It died of exhaustion,
starved and gasping.”—Bulletin of William and Mary College, Vol. IV, No. 11, p. 1”.
"Every State was exhausted and without food. In the entire Confederacy there were
meat rations barely sufficient for the army for a period of twenty-five days, and the
winter (1S64) had just begun.” The History of North America, Guy Carleton Lee,
Ed. Vol. XIV, The Civil W ar from a Southern Viewpoint. W. R. Garret and
R. A. Halley.
“The Confederacy failed not because it was defeated in the field, but because it
was starved and crushed into submission.” Max Farrand, The Development of the
United States, pp. 2'M. Cf. Woodrow Wilson, History of the American People, Vol.
VIIT, Chap. IT. James E. Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compro
mise of 1830, Vol. V, Chap. X X VIII.
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be explained in any other way than on the basis of military organization?
Quite evidently, the military campaigns of the North, its superior industrial
organization and large resources had great effect upon the result of the
contest. But these conclusions cannot completely explain the result. No
treatment of the Civil War will he complete until the disintegrating internal
factors have been exploited. The psychological factors which enter into
the disruption of southern morale and the inherent political weaknesses
of southern war times are fundamental, for in the long run these must
determine the resistance.
The South collapsed, it is asserted, because of the lack of men, food,
war materials and resources for its population. These factors should he
carefully studied before we can determine whether these factors were
directly responsible, or whether behind these there were more potent
forces. The lack of material resources did occasion suffering in the
South, especially during 18(>5. This must be admitted. But no nation in
history has gained its independence or the freedom to follow its chosen
pursuits, without suffering, and without drinking the dregs of the hitter
cup of adversity. The wars of independence in the modern world have
been fought, as a rule, by peoples of inferior resources and populations.
Note the war of Netherlands with Spain at the dawn of the modern era,
in which thousands were butchered in the Spanish Fury and their country
inundated, but the Dutch were not beaten; the wars of Frederick the
Great, in which Prussia was drained of men and hoys by conscription, even
Berlin, the Capital, was captured and the country overrun, hut Prussia
was not beaten, and did not collapse in spite of the odds against her. The
American Revolution, the Spanish uprising against the Napoleonic in
vaders—these and more show clearly that more important than numbers
and resources—as weighty as they may be in the final result—are the
morale of the people and their attitudes toward the war. The war lesson
of modern history seems to teach that a nation like an individual is not
beaten until its spirit is broken.
The Earl of Chatham expresses the thought most clearly when he said—
“Conquer a free population of three million souls? The thing is im
possible !” Morale was just as fundamental a factor in the Civil War.
While there was a lack of food in the army and in certain military areas,
there was food in abundance in other parts of the South. While there
was an insufficient supply of munitions and the implements of war, yet
there were army supplies to be burned and destroyed at Richmond, Atlanta,
Savannah, Charleston, Fayetteville, Columbia and other places until around
March, 18C5. While there was an inadequate railroad system, yet there
were railroads, there was some railroad building, there were repairs to
roads, cars were built, there were wagons and horses, foundries and mills.
Truly, as in other wars, the nation denying the right of independence was
superior in all, but the people who were seeking independence seemed

http://dh.howard.edu/hush/vol2/iss1/3

2

Wesley: The Collapse of the Confederacy

H oward U niversity R ecord

379

powerless to use the nucleus given them for the building of greater
resistance.
The study which follows will be divided into three parts, ( 1 ) to deter
mine whether there were sufficient resources in the South for the conduct
of the war, and how long these resources were available; ( 2 ) how far
were internal dissensions and the lack of the spirit of cooperation respon
sible for the collapse; and finally, (3) was the morale of the Confederacy,
in any measure, responsible for the collapse. With the military events
constantly in mind, the determination of the importance of these factors—
and especially the last which is psychological and to some extent indefi
nite—will assist a more comprehensive treatment of our Civil War Period.
i

I.

T he R esources

of t h e

C o n fe d e r a c y .

Food. The land of the South is rich in the possibilities of production.
In the variety of its natural food production, the South was more than
equal to the North. But in the South the tillage was rude and primitive,
and it was carried on by slave-labor. In the North, the improved processes
of machinery made possible a large production in proportion to the number
of laborers employed. In the lower states of the South land was easily
tillable. The seasons are long, so that two or three crops of vegetables are
raised in a year.
The cotton crop of 180(1 amounted to 1,801,000 bales, and in 1801,
it consisted of 3,819,000 bales.a The advice of the press, agreements of
planters’ conventions, the appeals of governors, the resolutions of legisla
tures, a joint resolution of Congress and an appeal from President Davis
encouraged the substitution of food stuffs for cotton .3 A decline in the
production of cotton followed. It continued through 18(52 and 18(53; in
18(51, the crop was only one-eighth as large as the crop of 18(51, and the
harvest of cereals and food was larger .4 Travelers tell of the condition
of the food production. W. Carsen, an English merchant, in 18(52, tells
of the excellent dinners of cold fowl, baked opossum, apples, cracked
- M. B. 1Iammond, The Cotton Industry. Publications of the American Economic
Association. New Series, No. 1, Appendix. Tile New York Shipping and Com
mercial List made the estimate for 1861, 3,050,080 bales. Ibid., pp. 258. The British
Consul at Charleston, August, 180:2, estimated the crop for that year as not exceeding
1,500,000 bales.
3 The Richmond Examiner, March 19, 1862, regarded the production of another
large cotton crop not only as a peril to “our country and cause by famine, but would
prejudice the interest of the cotton planters themselves in cheapening the cotton
product.” The results of these efforts to reduce cotton production is noted by
Governor Vance. Off. Reds. Rebell. Ser. IV, Vol. 11. 47:5,TOO. Appleton’s Annual
Cyclopedia, 18(52, pp. 253, 200.
4 Schwab, pp. 279. Jones, Rebel W ar Clerk, II, pp. 10. Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV,
Vol. II, pp. 181. Two months in New Orleans and the Southern States, pp. 67.
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corn and sweet cake, which he found for sale at various stations along his
route, lie admits, however, that owing to the blocking up of the railroads
with troops, food scarcity in the markets resulted. After six weeks of
travel, he finally concluded that “the South cannot be starved out * * *
and any notion that the South is now dependent on any outside people for
food is a fallacy and may as well be given up." Concerning the army, he
states, that "in the matter of food, the troops of the army of the Southern
Mississippi were at least as well off in time of war as in peace.” ■"
In some places in 18113, there was actual hardship from the want of food.
Jonathan Worth, a prominent citizen of North Carolina, at one time Treas
urer and later Governor, wrote to a friend, January 5, "all well but on the
verge of starvation,” and later, “we are almost starved out." “ Governor
Vance, of the same state, informed Secretary Seddon of the War Depart
ment that, in the interior of the state, “there was much suffering for bread,
already, and will be more on account of the failure of crops from
drought.” 5*7 The crop of this year was short. Georgia had planted a
large amount of corn hut on account of drought the return was not as
estimated at first.8*10 In January, President Davis wrote Governor Brown
of Georgia that, “the possibility of a short supply of provisions presents
the greatest danger to a successful prosecution of the war.” 11 In other
parts of the South, there were crop failures during 18(18, which were very
depressing in their effects.1" During 18(11 and 18(18 the letters of General
lieauregard show a want of subsistence. In 18(11 he complains that some
of his regiments had nothing to eat for more than twenty-four hours, and
that military movements were impossible because only one wagon and four
horses were assigned to every hundred men.11 Across the Mississippi,
supplies seemed to he plentiful. Major Lockett of the Commissary De
partment, after a journey through Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, tells
of the quantities of cattle grazing near the roads, and of the flocks which
“might be used in furnishing supplies to the troops in this department.” 12
It was said also, that “the crops and gardens, and orchards yielded plenti
5 Ibid., pp. 80-87.
"Jonathan Worth, Correspondence, I, pp. 222, 227.
7 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 412.
8 Ibid., pp. 404.
0 Ibid., pp. 370.
10 A report of Secretary Seddon, January 3, 1803, stated “the harvests of the past
season have not generally proved propitious, and notwithstanding the much larger
breadth of land devoted to the culture of cereals and forage, the product in many
extended districts of the Confederacy is below the average, and in some threatens
scarcity.” Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 292.
11 August 22, 1801, General Beauregard wrote, “the want of food and transporta
tion has made us lose all the fruits of our victory.’’ Roman, Military Operations of
General Beauregard, I, pp. 120, 179, 208.
1- Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I, Vol. LIT, part II, pp. 438.
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fully and that all kinds of poultry thrived in Mississippi.” 13 Florida had
an abundant crop in 1S(>‘2.14
As the year 18(13 advanced, hopes were high for an abundant harvest
and plentiful supplies. A traveler along the Danville Railroad in Vir
ginia wrote to the Richmond Kxaminer that “fields of wheat were most
promising," that "on either side of the railroad, the golden-colored areas
are spread out in all their beauty.” The writer was informed that, "such
a wheat crop had not been garnered for a quarter of a century, and that
such was the expectations of farmers everywhere." 15* Governor Brown of
Georgia wrote to President Davis, that there were many wild cattle in
lower Georgia and Florida .1,1 General Sherman wrote to his brother, that
there was plenty in Texas and in other parts, and "we have found every
where abundant supplies, even on the Yazoo, and all along the river we
found cattle and fat ones feeding quietly. The country abounds in
corn." 17* Dana wrote Secretary Stanton at Washington, May 4, 18(53,
that "beef, cattle and corn are both abundant everywhere. The enemy is
not suffering for want in the least." 1s
In spite of these reports, the city markets continued to show a scarcity.
There was famine in the midst of plenty. The urban population, and in
some cases, the army was suffering from the want of food, while there
was an abundance in the country districts. The newspapers raised con
stant complaints against the farmers who would not sell their products and
who were said to be holding their food for better prices. Others upheld
the farmers and said that they were suffering from the deranged currency,
impressments and the taxes in kind. These were burdens to the farmers
and they produced continued dissatisfaction.10
In January, 18(14, General Maury wrote to General Polk that there was
plenty of meat being cured in Alabama, and that some beef cattle was
awaiting his call.-" In the same year. General J. K. Jackson of Florida
estimate,! that Florida would produce annually YuOni) heads of beeves,
equal to 10,(100,000 pounds, 1,000,000 pounds of bacon, and 1,000 hogshead
of sugar, fruits and other provisions.-1 In Mississippi, there was an abun
13 Publications of Mississippi Historical Society, \'H . pp. 111.
14 Off. Reds. Rebell.. Ser. IV. Yol. II, pp. 487.
4" Richmond Daily Kxaminer, June :27. 1803.
1,1 Off. Reds. Rehell., Ser, 1Y, Yol. IT, pp. 740.
17 The Sherman Letters, January 6, 1804, pp. 180. In the same year, he wrote:
“We Kind an abundance of corn, hops, cattle, sheep and poultry. Men who came in
advance have drawn hut two days' rations in ten and are fat." Home Letters, Howe,
pp. .‘1(10.
"O ff. Reds.
10 Ibid., Ser.
-"Off. Reds.
- 1 Ibid.. Ser.

Rebell., Ser. I, XXIV, pt. I, pp. 84.
T, XXXV, pt. II, pp. 494-400. Richmond Examiner, Oct. .41, 18(14.
Rebell., Ser. 1, Yol. XXXII. pt. :>, pp. ,Vc>.
I. Yol. XXXY, pt,
pp. (100.
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dance even after supplying the requisitions of the army up to 18<>-t, when
the removal of slaves, the impressment of horses and mules and the
invasions of the state produced an apparent exhaustion.-- The diaries and
memoirs of soldiers mention days of scarcity in the early part of 1S(> t, hut
says Jones, in the Surrey Light Artillery, "as the fall and winter of 18(il
approached and the tax-in-kind began to he collected, the supplies furnished
the army became more liberal and in greater variety.’’ 2:1
General Northrop, of the llureau of Subsistence, in a report, December,
.18(1 f, to Secretary Seddon, wrote that there had been no complaint or
suffering from defect of subsistence in any armies outside of Virginia,
"the territories from which they draw having been undesolated by the
enemy." lie added that there was then in Richmond or en route only
twenty-live days’ rations for 1()(),<>()() men.-1 But when the paymaster came
around Camp I lenrico. Virginia, and gave the soldiers four months’ pay,
the hucksters appeared with "pies and things,” and retail venders of things
to eat plied a large trade.-"' In the newspapers there were advertisements
during TSli.'S, 18(14, 18(15 of hundreds of instances of the sale of groceries
and foods. The auction sales were very frequent.
There were speculators who drove prices higher and made food more
scarce. In August, 18(>2, the Governor of Florida wrote to the Florida
delegation at Richmond urging them to take steps to meet the nefarious
smuggling of speculators who charged extortionate prices. Governor
Vance, of North Carolina, in September, proposed a state convention to
fix prices, and by proclamation he forbade the export of provisions from
the state, in order to prevent the seeking of higher prices jn other markets.
President Davis wrote to other governors urging price fixing by the states
as a remedy against speculators."2'1 Sermons were preached against the
"godless Shvlocks,’’ as they were called. The Governor of Virginia beted the unpatriotic extortioner who found the war a blessing. In Janu
ary, 18(15, a rumor was spread in Richmond that the Secretary o. War
was appointing men to hunt up speculators, and Jones, the War Clerk, in
his diary,says that the Jews and others were busy with their hand-carts and
wheelbarrows, removing barrels of flour from the center of the town to
the outskirts of the city, being fearful of impressments.22*27
In the same month. General Lee wrote to Secretary Seddon, that the
country was swept clear, and that his army had only two days’ supply.
General Northrop stated that General Lee’s army might he provisioned
from southwestern Virginia, where there were Ion,non bushels of corn
22 Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Centenary Series Ii, pp. :.’<M.
2:1 Jones, Surrey Light Artillery, pp. :20<i.
21 Off. Reds. Rebell.. Ser. IV, Yol. 11T, pp. 0151-0:>:4.
2r' Jones, Surrey Light Artillery, pp.
211 Stephenson, The Day of the Confederacy, pp. 78.
27 Jones, Rebel W ar Clerk’s Diary, II, pp. '.1ST.
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and a great deal of meat, but he added that three things were necessary,
funds, wagon transportation and the cooperation of the people.-8 In some
manner this need for General Lee’s army was met, for later General Lee
reported that the crisis of starvation in the army was passed. In March.
18(15, General Longstreet reported to General Lee that there were large
quantities of provisions in North Carolina—"a two or three year supply.”
He urged the seizure of the gold at Richmond in order to purchase food,
as the people would take the gold hut not the Confederate Currency.-''
From Alabama, the report came that “the new bacon crop” would he large
hut that it could not he controlled without funds. Additional evidence on
this point is shown in a dispatch, March 10, 1803, by Major French to
General I. M. St. John of the Bureau of Subsistence, in which it is said
that the crops south of North Carolina, in Georgia, Alabama and Missis
sippi were never so large, that with railroad communications restored
and with “gold or United States Currency to operate in sections where
Confederate money is not acceptable,” the estimate for the year could be
doubled. From North Carolina and Virginia, he could secure 12,5(10,000
rations of bread and 11,500,000 rations of meat; and from East Tennessee
15,000,000 rations of bread and 5,000,000 rations of meat additional."'"
Colonel Williams, of the Subsistence Department, sent a report of the
same date that quantities of supplies were available in East Tennessee and
Virginia, lie concluded that the question of feeding the army depended
upon “a judicious management of transportation and the control of onehalf a million of dollars in coin, together with $150,000 per day in
Treasury notes.” 28*301 In a subsequent report he stated that the combined
exertions of the officers and the Commissary, during the month of March
and up to the first of April, 1805, kept all the sub-depots on the lines of
railroads in Virginia nearly always full."2
Major Claiborne, of the same department, wrote that there is a most
ample supply to sustain our armies—to obtain them was the only question
presented to the department. “Energetic action in transportation,” he
continued, “and earnest efforts in the collection of supplies will avail much
hut the officers must he supplied with means * * * the hoarders are
surfeited with paper money, and these stores can he obtained only by the
use of gold or the bayonets of the enemy.” 33 General Sherman, at the
beginning of his March to the Sea wrote that his soldiers “liked pigs, sheep,
28 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I. Vol. XLVI, pt. 2, pp. 1033.
20 Ibid., Jones wrote, January 1G, 18G5, "The Commissary General says 100,000
bushels of corn for Lee's Army may be got in southwest Virginia.” Rebel W ar
Clerk's Diary II, pp 380.
30 Off. Reds. Rebell.. Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, pt. 2. pp. 1289.
31 Ibid., pp. 1297.
32 Ibid., pp. 1298.
32 Southern Historical Ass. Papers, Vol. Ill, pp. 100.
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chickens, calves and sweet potatoes better than rations. We won’t starve
in Georgia.” At the conclusion of his march he wrote, “We came right
along living on turkeys, chickens, pigs, bringing our wagons loaded, as
we started, with bread.” 34 General Sheridan in his official report of his
raid to the James River says, that he found “provisions for man and
beast in great abundance all along bis march.” 33* The Richmond Examiner
of .March 27, 48<>o, adds the comment that “this is a beautiful commentary
upon the liberality and policy of our people—when General Lee calls for
provisions to feed his army we are told that this man and that have given
them all, but when the Yankee raiders come along, they find meat houses
and corn cribs or cellars filled with abundance.” 30
By April 1, 1805, there was collected the following amount by the Con
federate Commissary:
At Richmond, Va., 300,000 rations of bread and meat.
At Danville, Va., 500,000 rations of bread.
At Danville, Va., 1,500,000 rations of meat.
At Lynchburg, Va., 180,000 rations of bread and meat.
At Greensboro, N. C., and vicinity, 1,500,000 rations of bread and meat.
These collections did not include forage by field trains of the armies
under orders from their own headquarters, nor the depot collections at
Charlottesville, Staunton and other points.37 At the time of the evacuation
of Richmond, Major Claiborne estimated that there were 400,000 rations
ol bread and meat. These were sent out by railroad and wagon transpor
tation, the residue was "distributed or appropriated by the people of Rich
mond.” 33 A few days after the evacuation, Mr. Breckinridge, Secretary
of War, reported that General St. John had asked General Lee where he
should locate a large quantity of rations which he had secured; the replv
of General Lee was that the military situation made it impossible to
answer.3'3 Colonel T. G. Williams, Assistant Commissary General, re
ported that during the month of March, and up to the first of April the
depots were full.4" In the early part of 1SG5, the country had recovered
rapidly from Sherman’s March, and we are told that in Georgia “the fields
were tilled, the crops were growing, but people were still short of pro
visions and that no one wants to take Confederate money." 41 General
Joseph K. Johnston stated that in February, 1S(>5, rations for sixty thou
34 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I, Vol. XLVI, pt. 2, 12‘JS, '99.
33 Sherman Home Letters, pp. 313-316.
3,1 Richmond Examiner, March 27, 1863; Marcli 23, 1863.
37 Southern Historical Report, Vol. III. pp. 99-100.
35 Ibid., pp. 106-107.
33 Ibid., 104-103.
40 Ibid., pp. 106.
41 Andrews, Diary of a Georgia Girl. pp. 167.
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sand men for more than four months were stored in the principal depots
between Charlotte, Danville and Weldon, and that before April 20, more
than : 00,(100 rations had been collected in various depots between Char
lotte, N. C., and Washington, Georgia, “in a district that had been thought
destitute.” 42 The Commissary was not always efficient in its collection
and storage of food. Frequent reference is made to depots of provisions
being neglected, to quantities of corn, wheat, bacon and potatoes which go
to waste and "are either lost or stolen through the carelessness of railroads
and transportation companies.” 4:i
From the above, it would seem clear that there was some food in the
Confederacy to the end of the war. It is certain also that there was some
privation and suffering on the part of both the army and the people.
There was food in plenty in parts of the South during all the years of the
war and there was scarcity in all the years. The situation grew more
acute as the war continued, hut there is no evidence to show that the food
situation became so alarming in 1805 that it,—per se,—produced the col
lapse. There was abundance of food in 18(15, not only in the lower South
hut in the very areas in which the armies were operating .44 The army was
upon a short allowance of food in the first year of the war and in the last
year of the war. But in the country there was really no lack of supplies.
The fault for the shortage may he discovered either in the inefficiency or
inexperience—and probably both—of the Commissary Department, and in
lack of adequate means for equitable distribution. Quantities of foodstuffs
were raised in the South, hut the army and city dwellers did not receive it.
When Mrs. Chesnut left Richmond for Kingsville, S. C , in 1865, she
found "creature comforts of all kinds—green peas, strawberries, asparagus,
spring lamb, spring chicken, fresh eggs, rich yellow butter, clean white
linen for one’s bed, dazzling white damask for one’s table.” She concluded
"it is such a contrast to Richmond, where I live.” 45 The problem of food
supply, aside from military interference, was one of distribution. If the
railroads had been properly utilized and replaced when worn, or if wagon
transportation had been supplied, and if those areas which had supplies,
had been willing to divide with those areas which had not, the food problem
would not have been so acute. But one cannot imagine the Confederacy—a slave-holding regime, based on states rights and individualistic doc■*- Military Operations, J. E. Johnston, pp. 375, 410.
4:1 Watson, Life in the Confederate Army, pp. 372.
44 Brigadier-General E. P. Alexander of the Confederate Army, writing in the
Century Magazine, No. 31, pp. 620, states that "times were often hard in the field
and camp, but this cut little figure when the trial of battle was on, and we never
lost a field that I know of, for lack of food, clothing, ammunition, or anything that
money might buy.”4
4"’ Chesnut, Dairy, pp. 308.
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trines—maintaining any other ground than that which its history reveals.
Other action was inherently impossible.
Il’ur Supplies and Manufacture. During the decade, 1S5(l-18(iO, the
South was undergoing an economic renaissance. It was rapidly turning
from an agricultural to an industrial economy. Manufacturing increased
rapidly, and if the war had not come, it seems safe to conjecture that the
South would have developed an industrial life in spite of i t s e l f . D u r i n g
the war the South was inadequately supplied with war materials, and it
was seriously handicapped hv this scarcity, Before the war, nil manu
factured products had come from the North and the beginning of hostilities
cut off this supply and forced upon the South the establishment of a variety
of industries.
The supply of arms was obtained from three sources, ( 1 ) from the
arsenals and armories of the United States which were seized by the Con
federates at the outbreak of the war, and from the defeated armies of the
Union; (2) from the manufacturing plants, public and private, which
were established during the war, and (3) through the Blockade. Seizures
of large quantities of arms were made at the opening of the war, and
besides these, the Memphis Appeal states that there were 5,000,000 private
arms which could he used for all practical purposes.47 It is a well known
fact that every southern master had his gun, which was used for hunting
and as a protection. Many such arms were old flint locks, which after
alteration were almost worthless. The armies of the South went forth
with “single and double barreled shotguns, squirrel rifles, muskets, flint
locks and old pistols." Small arms factories were established in the lower
South, especially in Alabama.48 Sea-coast and seige guns were made at
the Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond. So successful were these opera
tions that in 1803, General Gorgas could write that the army on this side
of the Mississippi was adequately supplied and possessed artillery" finite
equal to that of the enemy.4” In November, 18G3, it was reported that
the supply of arms was steadily increasing. The armories at Richmond,
Fayetteville and Asheville had produced about 28,000 small arms during
the year. Private establishments had increased this number to 35,000,
and it was estimated that 50,000 would he made by the year ending
September 30, 186-i.50
40 Publications. North Carolina Historical Association, Bulletin 20, pp. 48-49.
47 De Bow's Review, 1801, pp. 077-078.
4S Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I. Vol. LII. pt. 2, pp. 480-4S1.
411Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. II. pp. 950.
But at the end of the year, his report showed that about 20.000 were made in
stead of 50,000; it was added, however, that 20,000 were on the way from Europe.
Secretary Scddon reported in I860 that arms of approved kinds were being made
with more facility, at more places and in larger numbers than at any previous
time. Off. Reds. Rebell, Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 956-957.
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Quantities of small arms were received through the Blockade; from
September 30, 1802, to September 30, 1803, 113,504 were received, together
with "large quantities of saltpeter, lead, cartridges, percussion caps, flannel
and paper for cartridges, leather, hardware.” Four steamers were engaged
in carrying out cotton and bringing in supplies.’1 At Selma, Alabama,
there were the state and Confederate arsenals, and a naval foundry with
machinery of English make. It is estimated that one-half of the cannon
and two-thirds of the ammunition which were used during the last two
years of the war were manufactured at the Selma foundries and factories.
Cannon, siege and sea-coast guns were made at the Tredegar Iron Works.
A laboratory for smelting lead was situated at Petersburg, Va. It was
capable of smelting a thousand pounds of lead per day. The arsenal at
Richmond grew to large proportions and produced the ordnance stores
which the army of the North required. The arsenals at Augusta and

Off. Reds. Rebell., Ibid., pp. 1)55-956.
An editorial in De Bow's Review, 1801, stated "all over the South, there are
the most gratifying evidences of progress in the arts and manufactures, stimulated
hy the presence of war and of non-intercourse. Artillery, small arms, gunpowder
and every description of ntissle are being fabricated; and necessity which is the
Mother of Invention, will soon make us self-sustaining in everything." pp. 077-678.
Governor Shorter of Alabama wrote to the Confederate Chief of Staff, describ
ing the situation in Alabama as follows: "Coming over the mountains you visit
Tuscaloosa, where are located a large cotton factory, and tannery, and shoe estab
lishment and iron foundry- -leaving Tuscaloosa and proceeding south upon the west
ern line of Bibb County, you come upon the Bibb County factory, one of the largest
in the state. * * * At Gainesville the Confederate Government has a hospital, work
shops and valuable stores, and at Demopolis, supplies * * * at Selma, besides the
Alabama Arsenal, removed to this city from Vernon, the Government has estab
lished there an extensive naval foundry, where it hopes very soon to cast the
heaviest ordnance. Quantities of shot and shell are already being turned out, and
before a great while it is expected to roll there heavy iron-plating for our men of
war. The state is now establishing there a manufactory of spinning cards, cotton
and woolen—also the Alabama Arms Manufacturing Co., which contains machinery
for the manufacture of the Enfield rifle * * * Both in this city and in Selma there
are railroad depots and machine shops for manufacturing cars and repairing en
gines * * * along the line of the Alabama and Tennessee River Railroad are located
some of the most valuable iron establishments in the Confederacy. They are in the
counties of Bibb, Shelby and Calhoun.” Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I, Vol. I.II, pt. 2.
pp. 480-181.
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Selma were serviceable to the armies serving the South and the W est/'2
Preparations for the production of gunpowder were begun by the estab
lishment of two private mills in Tennessee. Later a government mill was
established at Augusta, and another at San Antonio/’2 After 1K(>2, the
former was in full operation; and in the year ending 18(13, over one
million pounds of powder were produced. At the beginning of 18(15,
5,000 pounds per day were being manufactured/’1 The principal in
gredient in the manufacture of gunpowder was niter. Heels of niter were
discovered in Alabama, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and
Georgia. By October, 18(14, the Confederate niter beds produced from
two to three ounces of niter per cubic foot of earth, and the average
The principal establishments for the supply of ammunition, small arms and
artillery under Government control were as follows:
(Dates indicate the periods when they were still found in operation.)
December, iS6/
N ovember, 1S63
September, iS6r
Richmond—Arsenal
Richmond—Arsenal
Richmond—Laboratory
Armory
ArmoryArmory
Laboratory
Laboratories
Fayetteville—Armory
Fayetteville—Arsenal
Clarksville—Harness
Augusta—Arsenal
Petersburg—Smelting
Armory
Charleston—Arsenal
Asheville—ArmoryWorks
Mt. Vernon—Arsenal
Charlotte—FoundryDanville—Depot
baton Rouge—Arsenal
Laboratory
Virginia Military Institute Fayetteville—Arsenal
Columbus—Arsenal
Armory
(Off. Reds. Rehell., Ser.
Athens—Armory
IV, Vol. I, pp. 022.)
Asheville—Armory
Tallahassee—Armory
Salisbury—•
Augusta—Arsenal
Charlotte—Foundry
FoundryLaboratory
Powder Mills
Charleston—Arsenal
Macon—Arsenal
Augusta—Arsenal
Laboratory
FoundryFoundry
Powder Mills
Montgomery—Arsenal
Atlanta—Arsenal
Columbus- -Arsenal
Foundry
Selma—Arsenal
Macon—Arsenal
FoundryLaboratoryMills
Foundry
(Southern Historical As
Montgomery—Arsenal
sociation Papers, Vol.
Columbus—Arsenal
II, pp. 01. Ibid., Vol.
Selma—Arsenal
XII, pp. 74.)
Foundry
Mills
(Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser.
IV, Vol. II, Pp. 958.)
Davis Rise and Fall.
1. It is stated in this study- that there were
Schwab, Confederate States, pp
few plants in operation after 1803. The above table and the subsequent statement
by General Gorgas definitely refutes this statement.
54 Off. Reds. Rehell., Ser. I, Vol. II, pp. 957.
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European niter beds after four years of age produced four ounces. By
the year ending September 30, 1804, General Gorgas reported that “the
mechanical means for the production of powder are ample for a war con
ducted on any scale, and so arranged as to be almost beyond capacity.’’
In the same report of 1804, General Gorgas remarked that “while the
army has been well supplied during the past year, there are causes
operating which will render future results less satisfactory. The chief
of these is the diminution of skilled workmen. Without statistics I can
only assure you that the number and quality of workmen have greatly
fallen off since the middle of the year 1<S0:>. While two years ago it was
difficult to get machinery, we have now a surplus and cannot get workmen
to run it. This opens a most melancholy prospect and indicates an evil
that cannot too soon be corrected. While we are importing workmen by
twos they are leaving us by the hundred. I formerly reported to you that
from Christmas, 1S(>:5, to May, 18(> 1, fifty-five men left our government
workshops in Richmond. This may give a glimpse of the exodus. Nor
is it that this class of men is disaffected or unpatriotic that they leave the
country—when called on they have fought and fought well—but workmen
will not fight and work.” r,li In response to an official request on February
!), 18(15, General Gorgas again reported that he could overcome all im
pediments in the production of arms and ammunition if he could secure
the workmen. Said he, “if these men and slaves can be permanently

r,r'O ff. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 733.
Ibid., pp. 734.
The foregoing statements concerning the manufacture of materials in the Con
federacy are supported by the Journal of General Gorgas. This quotation was fur
nished me by Professor Channing of Harvard University. It is a direct copy from
the manuscript. “April S, lSf>4. Tt is three years ago today since I took charge of
the Ordnance Department of the Confederate States, at Montgomery—three years
of constant work and application. I have succeeded beyond my utmost expecta
tions. From being the worst supplied of the Bureaus of the W ar Department it is"
now the best. Large arsenals have been organized at Richmond, Fayetteville, Au
gusta, Charles, Columbus, Macon, Atlanta and Selma, and smaller ones at Dan
ville, Lynchburg and Montgomery, besides other establishments. A superb powder
mill has been built at Augusta, the credit of which is due to Col. G. \V. Rattse.
Lead smelting works were established by me at Petersburg and turned over to the
Nitre and Mining Bureau, when that Bureau was at my request separated from mine.
A cannon foundry established at Macon for heavy guns, and bronze foundries at
Macon, Columbus. Georgia, and at Augusta; a foundry for shot and shell at Salis
bury, N. C .; a large shop for leather work at Clarksville, V a.; besides the armories
here and at Fayetteville, a manufactory of carbines has been built up here; a rifle
factory at Asheville transferred to Columbia, S. C .; a new and very large armory
at Macon, including a pistol factory, built up tinder contract here and sent to
Atlanta, and thence transferred under purchase to Macon; a second pistol factory
at Columbus, Ga. All these have required incessant toil and attention.” The Journal
of General Gorgas, pp. 33:5.
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attached to this bureau, I will answer for the supply of ordnance and
ordnance stores to the army.” ;'7
The supply of medicines for the Confederacy were obtained from four
sources, from the limited supply on hand, from purchases smuggled
through the blockade and Union lines, from captured supplies—often in
large quantities and from native medicine plants. A pamphlet was issued
by Surgeon-General Jones, of the Medical College of Georgia, in 1801,
in which directions were given for the gathering of medicines from plants.
Drug laboratories were erected at Uncolnton, North Carolina; Macon,
Georgia; Augusta, Georgia; Columbia, South Carolina; and Tyler, Texas.
Surgical cloth was made by southern cotton factories. Surgical instru
ments were scarce, but there was one company which manufactured them
in North Carolina.r,s
The manufacture of tools, implements and materials for the building of
bridges was begun at Richmond, Charleston, Augusta, Mobile, Demopolis
and in the Trans-Mississippi region.’1'1 The great difficulty was the lack
of iron. The production of iron, lead, copper and all minerals was added
to the Niter Bureau. President Davis reported that the Bureau was main57 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 1071.
r,s Publications of the North Carolina Historical Commission, Bulletin No. 23,
pp. 88-9:5.
■'"Off. Reds. Rebel!.. Ser. IV, Vol. I ll, pp. 1085.
'Pile estimated manufacturing capacity of the Government Powder Mills, according
to the report of General Gorgas, December, 1864. was:
Augusta Mills ............................................................ 3,000 pounds per day
Selma Mills ................................................................ 500 pounds per day
Raleigh Mills ...............................................................
000 pounds per day
Richmond Mills .......................................................... 1,500 pounds per day
T otal........................................................................ 7,000 pounds per day
Southern Historical Association Papers. II. pp. 01.
The estimated manufacture of rifles and carbines was as follows:
—450 men needed
Richmond Armory ............................... 25,000 rifles
Fayetteville ............................................... 10,000 rifles
—250 men needed
Columbia Armory ................................. 4,000 rifles
—125 men needed
Athens Armory ....................................... 10,000 rifles
—250 men needed
Tallahassee Armory .............................. 0,000 carbines—150 men needed
Total—55,000 rifles and carbines and 1,225 men needed.
Ibid., II, pp. (>:i.
The arms actually manufactured are shown in the following report for Jan
uary, lSO.'l:
Small arms (rifles, muskets, carbines and pistols)--Fabricated, 14,349; remaining
on hand. 9,870.
Public Armories—Rifles, muskets and carbines manufactured per month, 2,050.
Private Armories—1,550.
Sabers manufactured per month—3,500.
Off. Reds. Rebell, Ser. IV, II, pp. 299.)
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taining from twenty to thirty furnaces with an annual yield of 50,000 tons
of pig iron. In 180 1 it was reported that ten large iron furnaces in
Virginia, all hut three in Tennessee, all in Georgia and four in Alabama
were burned or destroyed by the advancing Federal troops. The report
adds that the Bureau has had to reconstruct as well as produce.110 There
were private iron works in North Carolina and Virginia engaged in adver
tising their wares and seeking workmen.01 There were two large foun
dries, Tredegar Works in Richmond and the Leeds Foundry at New
Orleans. The capture of these cities by the Federal troops ended their
existence as Confederate units. The Idaxall Flour Mills at Richmond
were said to he the largest on the continent.112 Several flour mills were
established in Yazoo County, Mississippi.03 Cotton mills were erected
throughout the South. A Government shop for the manufacture of cloth
ing for soldiers was conducted in North Carolina.04 Tanneries, saddle and
harness factories, shoe factories and private enterprises of many kinds
were conducted.°r’
In February, 18(14, there was complaint made to the Quartermaster that
many soldiers of General Lee's Army were without shoes. The reply
was that 100,000 pairs of shoes had been lost off Wilmington, but that
within two months there would he enough leather to manufacture 000,000
pairs of shoes.00 North Carolina arranged with manufacturers at different
Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. G95; Jones, W ar Clerk, II, pp. 1(40.
01 “D err’s Furnace
Six miles east of Lincolnton, N. C.
My furnace is now in full operation—
Molasses Mills, boilers, etc.., cast to order on moderate terms."
( Western Democrat, Charlotte, N. C., February 7, 1SG5.)
“Rehoboth Furnace in Blast
Three miles northeast of Iron Station, Lincoln Co., N. C.
The Proprietors are prepared to do castings of all kinds.”
(Raleigh Daily Confederate, March .40, 1805.)
“Iron! Iron!
The Lockville Mining and Manufacturing Company are now making
iron of the best quality for plantation purposes—
Iron now ready for delivery at the works in Chatham County.”
(Ibid., January 7, 1865.)
Same add for the Old Dominion Iron Works, Richmond, Va.
(Richmond Examiner, February 20, 18G5.)
02 Richmond Whig, April 4. I8G5.
03 Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Vol. I ll, pp. 63-G4.
04 Jones. W ar Clerk, II. pp. 354. 357. Proceedings of the North Carolina H is
torical Association. 18th Session, pp. 108.
05 Ibid., pp. 198-109. Schwab, pp. 271.
fis Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, III. pp. 1090.
The following appeared in the Richmond Dispatch: “Harvey Hellings & Jewepp—take pleasure in informing the public that they have in full operation a firstclass Ladies Shoes Manufactory—where they are prepared to turn out in any quan
tity the very finest quality of Ladies Shoes—”
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points in the state to supply its soldiers. To some, the state furnished
the hides and had them tanned on shares. Some hides were imported and
others were made by private manufacturers .67 The report of the Quar
termaster in February, 1865, stated that there was a "fair supply" of
leather, or hides in the vats, and a "moderate supply” of shoes, lie adds
that the manufacturing facilities were ample but that the raw material pre
sented a real difficulty.08
Large quantities of supplies were collected in Richmond, Raleigh and
other places in North Carolina. Quantities were destroyed. We are told
that in the retreat before Sherman from Raleigh, there were removed
100,000 suits of clothing, 10,000 pairs of shoes, 150,000 pounds of bacon.
At Salisbury, the length of four entire squares was needed to burn the
material, equal in value to about one million in specie.00 The material,
which was not distributed to the inhabitants on the evacuation of Rich
mond, was also burned. Yet, with these evidences of plenty in the army
depots, there seems to have been a want in the army. The South was
handicapped, but the scarcity seems to have been due to the matter of
equitable distribution than absence of the materials themselves. The Rich
mond Dispatch seemed to realize this when in an editorial it was said,
"we have men enough, material enough, resources enough; all we need is
the skillful and judicious use of our means.”70 A General Order from
General Lee, February 11, 1865, stated that the resources “wisely and
vigorously employed are ample, and with a brave army, sustained by a
determined and united people, success with God’s assistance cannot be
doubted.” 71
Transportation. The railroad development of the North was far ahead
of the development of the South. The former had roads which were
better built, equipped and manned. Moreover, the southern railroads were
for the most part local lines, connecting coast and inland cities.72 The
principal termini were Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New
Orleans, Richmond and Petersburg .73
There was a slight increase in the mileage in the South through the
period of the Civil War. In 1861, there were 9,283 miles of railroad
there, and in 1864 there were 9,511.74 This increase may have been07

07 Proceedings North Carolina Historical Association, ISth Session, pp. 108-109.
"HOff. Rede. Rebell., Ser. IV, III, pp. 1090.
,,u Last Ninety Days in N. C.. 140, 904-205.
7,1 Richmond Dispatch, February 1, 1805.
; in ff. Reds. Rebell, Ser. I. XIXI.
74 H. V. Poor. Manual of the Railroads of the U. S„ 1808-1809, pp. 20-21.
(Southern States included were Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Missis
sippi. Louisiana, Texas, Kentucky, Tennessee and Arkansas.) Off. Reds. Rebell, Ser.
IV, Vol. I ll, PP- 1095.
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occasioned by the advancing Federal armies, which found it necessary to
build such lines. But there was road building by the states, the Con
federate Government and by private concerns. The Confederate Govern
ment began in 18(il, to consider a railroad connection between Danville,
Ya., and Greensboro, N. C.. a distance of -18 miles. President Davis
called attention to it in his message. After protest by members of Con
gress against government aid being granted through the loan of a million
dollars, the work was begun; but it was not completed until May, 18(id.
Another connection was suggested from Selma, Alabama, to Meridian,
Mississippi. This route was to shorten the line from Richmond to Vicks
burg and New Orleans; and it would give Vicksburg access to Alabama
and Georgia. The distance was about 100 miles. It was completed in
18(12. Another route was begun during the war but it was not completed
until the close of the war. This was between Rome, Georgia, and Blue
Mountain, Alabama. The connection between Montgomery, Alabama, and
Selma, Alabama, was made before the close of the war, a distance of about
lb miles. Thus there was the building of nearly 200 miles of railroad by
the assistance of the Confederate Government between I 8(i] and 18(5-1.
In March, 18' b. a blanket appropriation of $21 ,000,000 was made to com
plete several small lines.7'
On the other hand, there were weaknesses in the southern roads'. The
roads terminating in several towns did not connect with one another, and
freight unloaded at one depot had to be hauled across town and reloaded
at the other. This was necessary in Petersburg, Chattanooga, Knoxville,
Bristol, Lynchburg, Savannah, Augusta, Charlotte, Raleigh, Wilmington
and other places. There was a shortage of cars and engines also. Before
the war the supply was scarce ; but some roads were building their cars
before the war. The Annual Reports of the Railroad Companies of the
State of Virginia for the year ending September, 18(io, states that the
freight cars built by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad Company will
challenge comparison with any in the United States, "for the perfection
to which they have been brought and the means adopted to render them as
desirable as possible.” 7'; An Fnglish merchant who traveled in the South
stated that he saw many hundreds of "southern made cars, for both freight
and passengers, and very useful things they seemed.” 77
During the opening periods of the war, the railroad companies expecting
an early termination of the war placed their reliance upon the stocks which
they had on hand, and consequently they made little effort to replenish the
stock.78 Soon all roads were suffering for want of cars and engines.
The few shops which could repair cars and engines had been taken over
Ibid., pp. 1114.
711 Annual Report, Railroad Companies of Va., 1800.
77 Two months in the Confederate States, pp. 77-70.
" O f f. Reds. Rebell, Ser. IV, Vol. II. pp. 1013.
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l)v the Government to l)e used for war purposes. The Government be
lieved that the railroads should look to their own repairs, and imbued with
laissez-faire doctrines, it took no hand in the repair of the roads until
necessitv demanded. Bv degrees the necessity of supervision arose; and
in lS(i1, \V. S. Ashe, formerly President of the Wilmington and Weldon
Railroad, was appointed Major in superintending the transportation of
troops. In 1S(P>, Colonel Wadly was assigned to the supervision and con
trol of troops on all railroads. His powers were more extensive than
those of Ashe. But his nomination was not agreed to for some reason by
the Senate. In 1S(>:>, General Lawton was made Quartermaster-General
and Colonel Sims was appointed in charge of railroads. This type of
supervising and conferring with the individual roads was as far as the
Government went until February, 38<>A, when an act was passed author
izing the Secretary of War to place any railroad, canal or telegraph line
under such officers as he should direct and to give it any necessary aid and
repair. This was passed too late in the war to be of any consequence.7;'
Gradually the tracks and the road equipment wore out, and smaller
lines were torn up in order to replenish the larger ones. Speed was
sacrificed in order to save the roads. Passenger trains were limited to
one or two per day in the latter part of 18(il.SH The railroads seemed,
however, to be prospering financially. The Richmond and Petersburg
Railroad Company paid a dividend of Id per cent in December, ISliL81
'Flic North Carolina Railroad Company declared a dividend, which was
semi-annual, of 25 per cent, in February, lMff.V- 'File Richmond and
Danville Railroad declared a dividend of 5 per cent, and the Richmond
and Petersburg later declared a dividend of 10 per cent.s:l
hi 1S(>4, the situation of the roads became serious. The various presi
dents had urged Congress to allow the shops and mechanics to be employed
in repair work, but to no avail. They were too much imbued with par
ticularism themselves to combine in order to have their work done by
themselves. In the same year. General Lawton wrote that the fact could
not be disguised that the railroads were in a critical condition and that the
needs of transportation must continue to cause greater anxiety as the war
progressed.81 The gauge of some of the tracks was not the same, and the
various roads refused to adopt any rule which would allow the use of a
united system. This was one of the difficulties between the roads of
Virginia and North Carolina. The Virginia roads were five feet. The
Piedmont roads were less than five feet.
The result of this act has been noted above.
"" Richmond Dispatch, November 28, 1803. August l, 1804.
M Richmond Examiner, December 28, 1804.
s- Western Democrat, February T, ISC.").
s:l Richmond Dispatch, December 10, 1803. Jones, W ar Clerk, IT, p. 340.
"'O ff. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I, XXXII, pt. 2, pp. 3D1-502.
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In February, 18(15, Colonel Sims wrote that new cars were being built
under difficulty, but that new engines could not he manufactured in
the Confederacy. He concluded that "not a single bar of railroad
iron has been rolled in the Confederacy since the war .” 85* And
yet, there was plenty of iron in northern Alabama, Tennessee, North
Carolina and South Carolina, which could have been extracted. Many
locomotives needed tires, hut somehow tires could not he secured
owing, as Colonel Sims said, to the fact that the work of the shops
was absorbed by the Government for war purposes, lie said that
every important article of consumption by the railroads could he produced
in the Confederates states, and what the roads asked was iron ore, per
mission for foundries, rolling-mills and a liberal system of detailing ma
chinists from the army. Many machinists had left the South. Colonel
Sims reported that the hardships of war and the fear of conscription had
induced many to leave, and in so doing “they felt but little or no interest
in our country or cause.” 80
\ \ ithout doubt the military and material resources of the South were
made less available by insufficient internal transportation also. The water
ways, both east and west, were occupied early in the war by the Union
forces. On the other hand, the steamboat owners would not allow the
use of their boats, and in order to secure transportation, the boats had to
be impressed.87 The Quartermaster’s Department sought to buy up the
available horse and wagon supply for the use of the arm y; and the Sub
sistence Department found much difficulty in getting its food material
transported. The farmers around Richmpnd in LSC15 stopped bringing
their food to market because the officers of the city impressed not only
the food but the horse and wagon. In order to quell the reaction which
set in, an order was issued stating that there were to be no seizures of
such material. Transportation was the great problem of the Confederacy,
and it was one of the influential causes in bringing about the collapse.
Numbers. The attempt has been made by many writers to show that
the South, from the beginning to the end of the war, did not have more
than (100,000 men under arms. While, on the contrary, they contend that
the North had 2,SOI),0(1(1 men under arms. Colonel Livermore has shown
that these figures are incorrect, and taking into consideration the differ
ences in the length of the enlistments, which differed in the two sections,
the disparity is not so great. But although there were only (100,000 men
85 Ibid., Ser. IV, III, pp. 1092.
80 Ibid., pp. 1092. Scr. IV, II. pp. 881.
87 Captain Kay of the River Rangers to General Polk, January I t, 1804. “A
great number of the western steamboat men will do anything for the South that does
not require the sacrifice of their boats—these people are like many through the lines,
they are for themselves first, and for their country next.” Off. Reds. Rehell., Vol.
LII, pt. 2, pp. 599.
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in the Confederate army, if this group had been really an army determined
to secure its independence and embittered against its foe on account of
manifest wrongs, it would have counted for more than it did. Is it not
strange also that out of a population of live and a half million peoples of
European descent and three millions of African descent, only (iOO,000
lighting men could he secured? In the course of the conflict every white
male between seventeen and fifty years, capable of hearing arms was called
to the colors. Certainly in this group there must have been one million
men of military years. The Census of ISliO hears out this conjecture.
There were over a million men of arms-bearing age in the Confederacy,
while about one-half of this number turned out to fight. In spite of the
efforts of the Confederate Government, in spite of appeals to patriotism,
only a proportionately small number could he found with Generals Lee and
Johnston. Clearly, if the South could muster only (iOll.OUO soldiers from
its population, and the machinists could not he kept in the factories, it
would seem that the heart of the South was not in the movement for
independence.
The historians who have written of the South have placed its failure
upon the advantage obtained by the larger numbers in the northern armies.
At the same time, they overlook the reproach cast upon the South by
the presence of so few of its soldiers at the front. In an area of over
100 .0(10 square miles, with a determined population of five and a half
millions, the South could have proved herself invincible. Those
who were in the army fought nobly, but they were only a part of the whole
South. The resources which were employed, were employed to the limit,
but they were only a part of the great store in the South. In January,
iHii."), it was estimated that there were 4T1.O0O Confederate men in arms.
Three months later, the number who surrendered amounted to about
11b.()()().ss If the heart of the South had been in the struggle, the expe
rience of past struggles for independence would have been repeated, or—to
sav the least—the South might have defended itself more effectively.
With regard to the resources of the South, the following conclusions
may be drawn : ( 1 ) There was food in the South in sufficient quantity to
sustain the army and the people, but there was a relative scarcity of food
in the urban and military centers due to faulty distribution and the difficulty
of attracting food to the markets; (2) the armies of the Confederacy were
not compelled to surrender because of a lack of food in the South or the
paucity of its resources; and (:>) the resources of the South were inade
quately employed because of a lack of trained industrial leadership. The
collapse of the South could not have been due, directly and completely, to
inadequate resources.

** T. I,. Livermore. Numbers and Losses, pp. 40, 137.
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II.

P o l i t ic a l

and

S ocial C o n d i t i o n s

in t h e

Confederacy.

The Cabinet. In I Slid, Jefferson Davis was probably the ablest Con
gressional leader from the South. Personally, he was a man of great
ability and strong will, but also a man of little tact in his personal rela
tionships. He had won his way by his efforts to a place of leadership in
southern affairs. The mantle of Calhoun had fallen upon him. His
career as Representative, Senator and Cabinet member had kept him in
public prominence, lie was a West Point Graduate, he had served in the
Mexican War and his service as Secretary of W ar under President Pierce
had increased his knowledge of military organization. President Polk
offered him an appointment as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, but he
refused the appointment on the ground that the President had no authority
to make such appointments. He had, therefore, both military training and
experience as a public officer. In his election as President of the Confederaev, there seems to have been little political intrigue. Some of the
delegates favored Cobb, others favored Hunter and R hett; but Davis
received the majority and finally the unanimous support of alb When his
name was presented at the Convention, the majority of the delegates
realized that he was the best qualified man then available for the Presidency. Moreover, he was reckoned as a conservative Secessionist, and in
addition to his ability as a recognized leader he was a candidate upon whom
the various elements could unite.sn
Criticisms of President Davis began to arise early in the war. When
the capital of the Confederacy was moved from Montgomery to Richmond,
he was blamed for its removal in spite of the fact that he had vetoed the
first bill for the removal. After the battle of Manassas, the failure of the
Confederate forces to follow up their victory was blamed upon Davis.
From this time forward, criticism grew in intensity, but in this early period
there was no organized opposition. The papers most opposed to President
Davis were the Richmond Examiner, under John M. Daniel and his
associate. Edward A. Pollard, and the Charleston Mercury, under Barn
well Rhett.
The first Cabinet was composed of Toombs of Georgia, as Secretary of
State; Walker of Alabama, as Secretary of W ar; Meminger of South
Carolina, as Secretary of the Treasury; Mallory of Florida, as Secretary
of the Navy; Reagan of Texas, as Postmaster-General, and Benjamin as
Attorney-General.!'° The Cabinet and the Government started out with
apparent unanimity, but this was not destined to last very long. Some
s-' "Everybody wants Mr. Davis to the General-in-cliief or President. Keitt and
Boyce and a party preferred Howell Cobb for President, and the fire-eaters per se
want Barnwell Rhett.” Chesnut, Dairy from Dixie, pp. (i. William & Mary
Quarterly. XXII. pp. 214. Dodd. Jefferson Davis, pp. 220.
!lfl Butler, Judah P. Benjamin, pp. 220-230.
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of these men, especially Walker and Meminger, seemed to have no peculiar
fitness for their positions, but it was doubtful whether their departments
would have been handled by others in any different or more successful way.
Xo leader of the South expected a long war, therefore Walker, the Sec
retary of War, might go about boasting that "the blood which would be
shed in the war might be wiped up with a pocket handkerchief.” As early
as July, hsiil. Mrs. Chesnut wrote, "and now I could be happy but this
Cabinet of ours are in such bitter quarrels among themselves—everybody
abusing everybody.” -11
The Master Spirit was manifesting itself. The training of the slave
holder showed itself in its hideous form in the matter of government.
Everybody in the Cabinet wanted to lead. Above them was a more
powerful will, that of the President. Differences soon developed and
changes in the Cabinet appointments were frequent. Five Secre
taries of War, three Secretaries of State, and four Attorney-Generals were
appointed during the war ."2 Alexander Stephens, the Vice-President, did
not work harmoniously with President Davis. 1le had been slow to assent
to leave the Union, his support of the government continued to be weak,
and his personal antipathy to President Davis was always evident. Said
he, "I was not born to acknowledge a master from either the North or the
South.” "3 Toombs disagreed with what seemed to him a weak war police
on the part of the government. He resigned from the Cabinet and ac
cepted a commission in the army. Soon thereafter he gave up his com
mission and retired, saying that he felt "little like fighting for a people
base enough to submit to such despotism from such contemptible
sources." 1,4 Mrs. Chesnut again writes, "there is a perfect magazine of
discord and discontent in that Cabinet; only wants a hand to apply the
torch and up they go.” '' ' But discord and criticism soon spread and
scores of men, prominent in their sections, broke into open hostility with
the administration.
President Davis was unable to quiet the discontent. President Lincoln
was also criticized, but he was tactful enough to quell the storms which
arose about him. The attacks upon the Confederate Cabinet grew more
violent in 18(>4; and Meminger was forced to resign under fire. The
principal attacks of the next year were directed against Benjamin, Seddon
and Northrop. A demand for the resignation of Benjamin in the Senate
failed only by a tie vote, the ballots standing eleven to eleven.'1" Seddon
51 Chesnut, Diary, from Dixie, pp. 90.
Southern Historical Association Papers, III, pp. (i-7.
!l:1 Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, pp. 7S5-7SO.
114 Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobh. American Historical Asso
ciation Report, II, pp. 595.
"’ Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, pp. 108.
""Journal of the Confederate Congress, IV, pp. 552-553.
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resigned under criticism February !), 18(i5; and in the closing days of the
war, Northrop resigned. It is said that his greatest sin seemed to have
been the fact that he was a classmate of Jefferson Davis at West Point .”7
The acuteness of the Cabinet situation may be discerned in a letter of
Thomas Bocock of Virginia, at one time Speaker of the House. After
suggesting to President Davis the reconstruction of the Cabinet, he stated
that a vote that the country lacked confidence in the Cabinet would have
the support of three-fourths of the members of C o n g r e s s . H e r e then the
spectacle is presented of a disunited Cabinet, quarreling among themselves,
criticized by Congress, distrusted by the country. How could the fighting
temper of a people be sustained when they had little confidence in those
who headed the Civil Administration? In accounting for the collapse the
psychological effect of this condition cannot be overlooked.
The Congress. President Davis found the first Congress inclined to
yield their "preconceived opinions" to his suggestions.11'1 In this first
Congress of the permanent government. February, 18(12, the relations of
the President and Congress became strained over the conduct of the war,
the suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus, Impressment and conscrip
tion. The last three measures were recommended by the President, and
the passage of them against well-founded opposition led to the cry that
Congress was subservient to the wishes of the President. But when the
first session closed, the power of the President was secure, although there
was much opposition in the Congress.
In the second session, 18(12-18(13, there were complaints of the lack of
food, criticisms of the Commissary Department, and the relations of the
Executive with the Congress was often strained. In the third session of
18(13, the same undisputed control by the President was manifest. During
the summer of 18(13, the President and the Cabinet were severely criti
cized, and there were predictions of opposition, but when the Congress
assembled in December, the President's recommendations were carried for
maintaining the army, increasing the revenue and a wider extension of the
law.10" Special committees were appointed to investigate the charges
against the Commissary Department, exemptions from military service and
Presidential appointments; and we are told that the President and Congress
parted "at the adjournment in bad temper.” 101
During the last session, November, 18(11, to March, 18(15, the President’s
veto was more freely used than in any other session, but it was often 17
117 Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, pp. 07.
!,x Off. Reds. Rebell.. Ser. I. Vol. XI,VI. pp. I 11 S, pt. 3.
”” Davis. Rise and Fall. I. pp. "04; II, pp. 341. Jones, the W ar Clerk, found that
there were not a dozen members in the whole Congress with any pretentions to
statesmanship." II. pp. 157.
111,1 Southern Historical Quarterly, V I XIX, pp. 23.
1111 Jones, II, pp. 1(11.
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overridden in both the Senate and the House. The last days of the session
were filled with criticism of the President-—veiled criticisms couched in
resolutions of information. It is conclusive, however, that President Davis
was the active leader of Congress in every session. 1lis veto was exercised
lltt times during' his term of office, while during the same period President
Lincoln exercised the veto I! times.1"- Just how much effect upon the
breakdown of southern resistance, the difficulties of the Cabinet, Congress
and the President had, it is difficult to say. Just how far the morale of
the army was affected by these controversies no one may say. However,
the mastery maintained by President Davis over both Cabinet and Congress
led the South to believe that another despotism was being substituted for
the despotism which had been rejected in 1861. There was no collapse of
the organized government until the collapse of the military, but in spite
of the secret sessions of Congress, it is very evident that the quarrels of
politicians as to the purposes of the war, and the methods of waging it
must have had its effect in dividing the opinions of the people and in
lessening the unanimity and collective support which had existed in the
early years of the war. The fortunes of the Confederacy had to contend
not only with the North but with the internal dissensions of its political
leaders. Such a situation must have been contributory to the moral col
lapse. George Eggleston says, that so marked was "the popular discontent
not with Mr. Davis only lmt with the entire government and Congress that
a Richmond newspaper dared to suggest a counter revolution as the only
means left of saving the cause from the strangling it was receiving at the
hands of its guardians at Richmond.” 103
Popular Opposition to Administration Measures. One of the most
frequent criticisms of Mr. Davis was his favoritism in appointments.
It was said that Northrop, the Commissary-General, was inefficient, hut
that he was kept in office by the favor of the President. From the begin
ning to the end of the war there were complaints against him .1"4 After the
first Bull Run Campaign, General Beauregard criticized the Department;
and in January, I 860, General Lee wrote General Northrop expressing
dissatisfaction with the Commissary and stating that 110 beef had been
issued to the cavalry for 18 months, 'file retention of General Pemberton
and General Bragg led to further opposition. General Bragg was called
"a man of iron head and wooden hand” by the Richmond Examiner, which
was circulated among his troops ; and a weekly on learning that he was
ordered to Wilmington gave utterance to the expression, "we understand
that General Bragg has been ordered to Wilmington. Good-bye, Wil
mington !” Such expressions must have had their effect upon the morale
of the soldiers and the people. The success of the Confederacy demanded
11,2 New England Magazine, V. pp. 372.
103 Eggleston, pp. 227.
104 Chestnut, pp. ‘J7.
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that the highest confidence and understanding should exist between the
President and the commanding generals, as well as between the command
ing general and the armv. between President Davis and General Joseph
K. Johnston, there was a feeling of mutual distrust. General Polk wrote
to Colonel Harvie of Mississippi, January, 1K(>1, suggesting that some
thing should be done to bring the two together. Later in the year, Gen
eral Johnston was removed, and General llood was given the command.
The popular clamor became so great for the reinstatement of General
Johnston, after the defeats of Hood in Tennessee, that Air. Davis was
forced to yield.1"’
The military reverses of 18("2 led to the enactment in February of a
law suspending the privilege of the writ of 1labeas Corpus. It was limited
to thirty days. In March the suspension of the writ was declared in
Richmond. It was extended during the next few weeks to other dis
affected counties in Virginia, Tennessee and South Carolina. At first
there was no opposition to the measure except from Vice-President
Stephens and isolated individuals, who insisted that the military should be
subservient to the civil authority. In 18f>:>, the law was again enacted.
But the opposition, especially in North Carolina, caused it to be dropped,
when it expired by limitation in August, 18(14.100 The Legislature of
North Carolina passed a resolution protesting against the suspension of
the writ. The Legislature of Mississippi instructed the Mississippi Sena
tors and Representatives to support a repeal of the measure. The Georgia
Legislature declared the writ unconstitutional.1"7 It is interesting to note,
on the contrary, that martial law was declared in the North, and it was an
effective means of restraining the opposition. It seems to have been suc
cessful because it was supported as a war measure by the people as well
as Congress. In the South, the States-Rights notions, over-developed
ideas of liberty and personal freedom hindered a similar development.105*17108
Another cause of opposition was the conscription of men to fill the ranks
of the army. At first there was voluntary enlistments to fill the army.
105 Off. Reds. Rcbcll., Ser. I, Vol. XXXII, pt. 2, pp. 59.U-5D4.
Said Governor Vance in a message, "I have not seen an official copy of the
act, but learn from the newspapers that Congress has conferred upon the President
the power to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus, in all cases of arrests made by
the Confederate authority. It" this be once admitted, no man is safe from the power
of one individual. He could at pleasure seize any citizen of the state, with or with
out excuse, throw him into prison, and permit him to languish there without relief—
a power I am unwilling to sec entrusted to any living man." Ibid., Ser. IV, Vol.
II, 18S.
107 Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society. Centenary, Ser., II, pp. 208.
108 Wrote Governor Brown to Secretary Scddon, "While the people of this state
are true and loyal to our cause, they are not unmindful of the great principles of
constitutional liberty and state sovereignty upon which we entered into this struggle;
and they will not hold guiltless those in power who,—have subverted and trampled
personal liberty under foot." Ibid., Ser. I, Vol. LI I, pt. 2, pp. 790.
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Then in March, 18(11, the President was authorized to call as many troops
as he deemed necessary. In December of the same year, an act was passed
offering a bounty of $.10 to volunteers of three years' service, and granting
to those who re-enlisted a furlough of sixty days with free transportation.
This method was found insufficient, and in April, 1S( ' , the President was
authorized to call out all male whites between the ages of eighteen and
thirty-five years for three years' service. In September, the ages were
extended to forty-five years, hut those between seventeen and eighteen,
and forty-live and fifty years were not required to serve outside the state.
The exercise of this power to conscribc aroused the feeling of the South.
It was difficult to reconcile the thought of a strong central power, com
posed of sovereign and independent states equally strong, waging war.
The people of the South resented the centralization to which the central
government was forced to go in order to fill the ranks of the Confederate
army. The Confederacy was formed as a protest against centralization,
and yet its people suffered oppressive measures of greater severity.1"0
At various times, the President and the Governors of most of the states
came into conflict upon questions connected with conscription, such as the
interference of the state courts in releasing conscripts on writs of Habeas
Corpus, disagreements as to the necessity of suspending conscription in
certain districts and the enrollment of the officials of the state. Governor
Vance of North Carolina protested against the enrollment of state
officers; 110 and the North Carolina Supreme Court declared in Johnson
v. Mallet in 18(>3, that all officers and agents of the state, provided for by
the constitution, were exempted from conscription.111 In 1804, the total
number exempted on the certificates of governors was approximately
18,800, of which 13,818 were in North Carolina and Georgia.112 In spite
of a decision of the Georgia Supreme Court declaring the conscript law
constitutional, Governor Brown created much trouble over the question.11:1
As in the North, many persons in the South sought exemption either
through department officials, Congressmen, or by seeking refuge within
the exempted classes. The persons exempted included editors of news
papers, postmasters, the followers of religions opposed to war, government
contractors and their employees, persons engaged exclusively in stockraising, one exempt being allowed for every 500 head of cattle, one for
250 head of horses or mules, one for 250 sheep, and one owner or overseer
on each plantation for twenty slaves. The total number exempted was10
10» Bulletin of the University of Georgia, March, HilT, pp. 451.
1111 Publications, North Carolina Historical Commission, Bulletin No. 15.
111 Off. Reds. Rchell, Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 755, 751.
113 Bulletin of the University of Georgia, March, 1;»17, pp. 4:20.
113 Bulletin of University of Georgia, March, 1<)17. pp. 4:20, 445 (state officers
excepted).
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estimated by the Superintendent of Conscription as (i?,(F>4, for the states
east of the Mississippi.” 4
In March, 1
another law was passed providing for hoards of assess
ment to determine the value of impressed goods. The prices were to he
published and the owners were to follow them in procuring sales. Toward
the end of the war these prices were invariably far below the market value
of the products. Farmers refused to sell their products for such prices.
They hid them, reserving them for better prices. The result was that
the system of impressment broke down completely. For the farmers
would not sell to the government for half the price which they could
obtain in the local markets. Few things are more difficult than to make
a man sell his goods against his own wishes and at a loss to himself.
The produce loan and the tax in kind bore heavily upon the morale of
the food-producing population ; and they actually lessened the available
supply of food by discouraging the bringing of it to the markets. When
agricultural products did reach the city, they were often seized by the
government at a price far below the market price. This action stimulated
the bitterest feeling against the military and the government.11415* So that
Governor Vance, writing to President Davis, could say, “I will not deny
that there is a bad state of feeling here toward the Confederate Gov
ernment.” 11,1
States-Riglits. The exercise of such arbitrary powers led to conflicts
between the state and central governments. The people of the states were
jealous of their rights as citizens of the states and they were suspicious
of the encroachments of the Confederate Government. The arbitrary and
over-bearing policy of the central government produced a depressing effect
upon the spirits of the people and the army. In South Carolina it was
proposed to organize a state army and to instruct the legislature to take
effectual measures to prevent the agents of the Confederate Government
front raising troops in South Carolina except by voluntary enlistment or
by applying to the executive of the state to call out the militia. In North
Carolina it was mortifying to Governor Vance, to find entire brigades of
North Carolina troops commanded by strangers and "in many cases our
brave colonels are made to give place to colonels from distant states.” 117
In contravention of the Confederate law an act was passed by the state
114 Ibid., pp. 4:I(i.
1K(i2-l8G4, pp. 77-7!).

Public and Private flaws, Confederate States of America,

1,5 General Northrop reported, " ( >ur officers have been unable to get anything,—
that impressments are impractible,- that the people will not supply grain under notice
of impressments which cannot he enforced, and will not prepare their crop for stile,
unless market prices are given. The people in both Carolinas and Georgia have vehe
mently opposed impressments." Off. Reds. Rebell, Ser. IV, Yol. Ill, pp.
Cf. Ibid., pp. 100S-10II.
1,11 Publications, North Carolina Historical Commission, Bulletin 15, pp. 54.
117 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV. Vol. II, pp. 18!l.
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legislature exempting millers, blacksmiths, salt-workers, etc.11' In Georgia.
Governor Brown and the Legislature insisted upon the right of the troops
to elect their own officers, for this privilege was provided by the constitu
tion of the state of Georgia. Secretary Seddon refused to recognize this
right. Governor Brown replied that he was forced to acquiesce in what
he considered "a great wrong to thousands of gallant Georgia troops and
a palpable infringement of the rights and sovereignty of the state.” 1111
When Atlanta was threatened by Sherman. Governor Brown wrote to
President Davis that the forty to fiftv Georgia regiments then engaged in
defending Richmond should he sent to Georgia. For Atlanta was in
danger, and Georgia would he overrun, “while her troops were taking part
in distant raids."
When Sherman continued to advance, he blamed the
administration and refused to place the remainder of the militia under the
President’s control, thus “surrendering the last vestige of the sovereignty
of the state.”
'Lite Governor of North Carolina threatened to recall the North Carolina
troops from service in other states, for they should serve primarily for
the defense of the state, "not to assume the responsibility of the Confed
erate Government." In Virginia, feeling was roused by the President’s
formation of the provisional state troops into a Confederate army.
Governor Milton of Florida protested against the action of the Impress
ment agents who forced the people to accept the prices which they offered.
Said he, “such action is incompatible with the rights of the citizens and
insulting to free men—better that Florida should he a waste of flowers,
enriched with the blood of her brave citizens than to be inhabited by them
as slaves or willing to he slaves.” 18*21
Many southerners thought that there was little to choose between the
despotism of President Davis and that of President Lincoln, and that the
southern despotism was quite as had as the northern despotism. From
this despotism, the threat was often made to secede. Early in the year
1S(;:>. the legislature of North Carolina had contemplated taking the state
out of the Confederacy. The Raleigh Progress, of which W. W. Holden
was editor, said "If North Carolina had a right to break off from the
Federal Government hy an act of her convention, she has the relative right
to break off from Mr. Davis’ government.” 122 Public meetings became so
frequent that Governor Vance issued a proclamation calling upon the
118 Jones, W ar Clerk, II, pp. 431).
ll!l Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. II, 737.
'-"Ibid., Ser. I, Vol. I,II, pt.
pp. 0S7.
""O ff. Reds. Rebell.. Ser. IV. Vol. II, pp. ‘>70.
'--C l. Publications. North Carolina Historical Commission, Bulletin 20, pp. 04.
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people not to seek “to cure the evils of one revolution by plunging the
country into another.” 12:1
Toward the close of the war, efforts were made by former Governor
Graham, then Senator from North Carolina, to bring about a concerted
action with Virginia to restore the states to the Union.1-1 He wrote Gov
ernor Vance, April s, 1S(;5. that he had had confidential conversations with
a committee of the Virginia Legislature, and that it was important to act
in conjunction with that body.'-' .March 5, ISti.j, John A. Campbell,
Assistant Secretary of War, described the condition in other states as
follows: "Georgia is in a state that may he properly called insurrectionary
against the Confederate authorities. Her public men of greatest influence
have cast reproach upon the laws of the Confederacy and the Confederate
authorities, and have made the execution of the laws nearly impossible.
A mere mention of the condition in Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky,
Western Virginia and the line of the Mississippi, the seaboard from the
Potomac to the Sabine and North Alabama, is necessary. North Carolina
is divided and her divisions prevent her from taking upon herself the
support of the war as Virginia has done—there is anarchy in the opinions
of men here and few are willing to give counsel and still fewer are willing
to incur the responsibility of taking or advising action.” 1211
In 1
resolutions were introduced into the Legislature of Georgia,
calling for separate state action to secure peace. President Davis ad
dressed a reply that such action “would tend to create discord instead of
united counsels, and to suggest to our enemies the possibility of a dissolu
tion of the Confederacy.” 127 That action in this regard was contemplated
is shown by a resolution introduced in January, 18U5, in the Confederate
Congress declaring that it was revolutionary for any state to negotiate for123*

123 In Alabama during January, 18G5, the state of feeling was reported as such
that even where local value in Confederate currency was offered for goods, they
could not be secured. General Northrop received a report from Major J. J. Walker
saying that they appealed in vain to planters for the immediate delivery of goods
and that the promise that there would he immediate payment had no effect on the
people. "They no longer credit any promise made by government officials. The case
may he stated briefly. The Government has lost the confidence of the people."
121 C o n n o r, John A. Campbell, pp. 173.
123 Last Ninety Days of the W ar in North Carolina, pp. 137-141.
12,1 Reminiscences and Documents relating to the Civil W ar during the year 1SG.3,
by John A . Campbell, pp. 30-31.
Governor Milton wrote from Florida, November 23, 18G3, "It is painful to me to
believe and to express the opinion, that there exists a necessity for the interposition
of state authority to protect the rights, lives and liberty of the citizens against the
military orders of Confederate officers for whom personally I entertain the kindest
feeling and utmost respect.” Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, II. pp. 073-970.
t-'7 Richmond Dispatch, January 10, 1SG3.
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peace. To which, Jones, the War Clerk, adds the comment, “ill-timed,
because self-evident." IJS
The states were jealous of their rights throughout the war, and one of
the greatest of its internal difficulties came through the clashes between
the central and state authorities. The right to withdraw from the compact
meant the right to destroy the Confederacy, and the right to nullify its
laws meant the right to prevent its existence.
Speculation. Rising prices made possible a large amount of speculation.
With prices rising from month to month, it was impossible for anyone to
lose in business it seemed, and many grew rich by investing their notes
in commodities and selling them at an advance in price. As the war con
tinued the speculation grew worse. Legislation was passed to prevent it.
In 18(>2, Governor Vance of North Carolina in a message to the Legisla
ture said that the demon of speculation and extortion seemed to have
seized upon nearly all sorts and conditions of men, and that all the neces
saries of life were fast getting beyond the reach of the poor.1-'-’ President
Davis in an address to the people of the Confederate States spoke of the
attempt of “groveling speculators to forestall the market and to make
money out of the life-blood of the defenders.” 130 Robert McHenry, of
Union County, Arkansas, wrote President Davis, that cotton speculation
on the Mississippi River had been carried on, on a very extensive scale,
that it was demoralizing the Confederate army in the Trans-Mississippi,
who were deserting and going home.131 Another writer, after quoting
the market prices, in January, 18(i5, asks the question, “Does the govern
ment mean to allow the rich speculators, the quartermasters, etc., to starve
honest men into the Union ?” 132
The newspapers took hostile attitudes to the importers of goods, for
speculation increased the frequency of blockade-running. Finally in 18G4,
a law was passed forbidding the importation of articles which were not
necessary to the army. However, this law was practically inoperative,
because smuggling went on and the incentive to import articles was in
creased by the profits to be made. Some of the states entered the business
of blockade-running. North Carolina clothed and furnished its troops
with many necessities by blockade steamers. On March !*, 18(>5, the
blockade business of North Carolina showed a profit of $1 ,W5,t>0(>. This
was largely made by the difference between the price paid by the state for
cotton and the value of the articles brought back by the steamers on their
return voyage to the state.133 A statement termed "official" was published138
138 Jones, W ar Clerk, I I , pp. 084.
i-» Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV , V o l. I I, pp. 181-1S5.
1:!"Ib id ., pp. 47T.

1:11 Publications, Mississippi Historical Society, Ceil. Ser. I I , pp. 19.
133 Jones, W ar Clerk, I I , pp. 1181.
13:1 N o r th Carolina Historical Commission, 18th Session, pp. 107.
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in the Richmond Dispatch, as a quotation from the Manchester Guardian,
to the effect that the total ventures made by English capitalists and specu
lators, counting the value of ships and cargoes, amounted to more than
sixty-six million dollars, from the port of Wilmington alone.1:54 The
English merchant, who traveled in the South during 1S(>2, remarked that
the people of Mobile drove a thriving trade with Havana.1:141 Trade and
speculation in these commodities continued until the capture of Wilmington
and the evacuation of the southern trade ports in 18(55.
Morale was affected in a direct way by this speculation in business.
The prices of necessities were passing beyond the reach of many persons,
especially the poor, and the body of discontented grew as a result. The
demand for blockaded goods and luxuries of all kinds, was. among the
moneyed class, far greater than the supply; and of course the goods which
commanded the highest prices were the goods which were smuggled
through the blockade. Among the upper classes, extravagance was
marked. Those who had gained by the war—such a one as Jones, the
War Clerk, describes, who kept a provision shop and he was described
as having spent $30,000 on the wedding of his daughter. He was known
to have been poor before the war. This class of rich persons was given
to luxurious living and display. Theaters and balls were the favorite
means of spending their wealth. In every large city this group was
present. But the capital of the Confederacy seemed to have suffered most.
The state of the currency is another indication of the loss of morale and
the decline of confidence in the government. The Confederacy was sup
ported as far as financial interests were concerned by the issue of j5aper
money and bonds. It has been estimated that the actual receipt in specie
of the central government was only $27,000,000 during the entire four
years, while the Treasury notes were over one billion.13" Paper money
always has as its foundation the faith of the people in the government
back of it. But the people of the Confederacy had not only faith, but
enormous quantities of cotton and tobacco were supposed to be the addi
tional security which would be used when the war was over. As the war
continued, the faith of the people grew weaker and the currency became
cheaper. The Confederate Government, as it needed money, manu
factured more of it. The currency became so debase that barter was
resorted to; even the physicians of Dinwiddie County, Virginia, decided
to accept corn as currency in return for services rendered.134*137 In ] 865,
in relation to the price of gold, according to the books of what the Rich
mond Republic, July (>, 18(55, called “one of the most reliable and promi134 Richmond Dispatch, March 21), 18(55.
133 Two months in the Confederacy, pp. 114 - 115 .
1311 Schwab, The Confederate States, pp. 45i.
137 The Daily Express, Petersburg, Va., February 22, 1805.
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nent Citv Brokers,” the price of gold in Confederate Notes was for Jan
uary, (iO to one.
In ]8(>l, a provision was adopted for the compulsory funding of the
notes in circulation, into four per cent bonds. If the bonds were taken
bv the people all notes of the denomination under one hundred dollars
might he exchanged for new ones in the ratio of three dollars of old
money for two of the new. As it has been said, this was really a con
fession of bankruptcy. If neither exchange was made, the old notes were
to he taxed out of existence. W hile the people of the South lost faith
in the money of their own government, they readily accepted the United
States greenbacks. So general did the circulation become that a law was
passed by the Confederate Congress prohibiting the trading with the cur
rency of the Northern government. The states issued notes which were
to circulate as money ; and especially in North Carolina, the people ac
cepted the state notes more willingly. Paper money circulation depended
to a large extent upon the faith of the people in the power of the govern
ment to pay its promises to pay. Aside from the operation of economic
laws, the unwillingness to take this currency is a manifestation of a lack
of confidence in the Confederate Government, and this must he considered
in noting the causes of the collapse of this government.
Social Bz’ils. Speculation shaded oft" into gambling, which became
general in the large cities of the South. The increase of gambling houses
in Richmond became so great that the authorities were forced to take a
hand. The Richmond Dispatch tells of laws being passed to suppress
them and of raids upon the establishments and the destruction of the
gambling paraphernalia, “faro-tables, chips,” etc.lns Another conternporarv states that gambling had to be suppressed in the interest of “a halfstarved people.” 130
Drutikardness and rioting accompanied this evil. The newspapers give
frequent accounts of conditions. Commenting upon the Court cases,
March 29, 18(>5, the Richmond Examiner jocosely remarked that “Bacchus
was on the rampage yesterday.” Later it was stated that hardly a day
passed without the ears being saluted by obscene language either from
drunken men or boys, “both white and black, men and women.” A cor
respondent tells of a scene in a street car, in which a woman and a man
were intoxicated and swearing in a most offensive way. lie concluded,
“What are we to expect if these things continue? What has our Chief
of Police been appointed for?” 14" Riots occurred in several places. In
Salisbury, North Carolina, the women rioted against food extortioners.138*
138 Richmond Dispatch, March 21, 1805.
,:!!l Eggleston, Rebel’s Recollections, pp. 102.

14,1 Richmond Examiner, January 30, 1805. Jones, the W ar Clerk, writes that.
There is much jollity and some drunkardness in the streets." II, pp. .204.
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In Atlanta, Mobile, Richmond and other places provision shops were
pillaged.141
Prostitution and miscegenation fill the court records, as shown by news
paper accounts. This picture of political and social conditions is not
attractive, but it shows the extent of the collapse very plainly. Society
had broken down in the Confederacy. Not alone was the desire to fight
gone, but the whole civilization was rapidly passing to its destruction.
The surrender of the armies not only revealed to the South its defeated
condition, but it seems almost to have saved the South from the complete
social disorder which would have followed a continuance of the war.
The quarrels of the Cabinet, the Congress, the growing opposition to
the administration and the States-Rights Controversy were heading the
Confederate craft towards the rocks. Initiated by a small group of leading
southerners, the Confederacy had been formed, out of southern discontent.
But the spirit of individualism was so strong among them that they could
not possibly tolerate a difference of opinion. The slave regime had as
sisted the growth of this feeling. We are accustomed to consider the
effect of the slave system upon the North and the slave. But we often
overlook the effect upon the white South. The master of a slave planta
tion was a feudal lord—a monarch of all he surveyed. It was impossible
for the average man to remain in this atmosphere without being affected
by it. Many southerners escaped the fullest effects of it, but others,
especially the leaders in the rebellion, were affected. There was a great
need for a spirit of self-abnegation in the South. As long as the master
ful spirit would recognize no submission to a common ideal and to a co
operative endeavor, there could be no successful result. Toombs, Cobb,
Rhett and Stephens were unwilling co-operators with many administrative
measures. This individualism had its effect upon the passing of the
Confederacy.
111.

Tin!

M

o r a le oe t h e

Confed eracy.

The first years of the war were enthusiastic years for the Confederacy.
A rapid victory was expected, and when this did not come, disappointment
appeared. This change in popular sentiment is noticed first in 1Stiff
The discontented class grew rapidly in numbers and power, so that by
February, 18(1:1, the Richmond Dispatch is forced to ask, “Can it be that
after all, we are not in earnest?" Governor Vance, as early as 18(12,
plead for “the stern and determined devotion to our cause which alone can
sustain a revolution. Bet us remember." said he. “that it is the spirit of
the people which tyrants cannot subdue. On this depends all. So long
as they continue harmonious, willing, self-sacrificing, the united armies of
141 Rhodes, History of the United States, V, pp. :iG2-366.

Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University, 1922

33

Howard University Studies in History, Vol. 2 [1922], Iss. 1, Art. 3

H oward U niversity R ecord

410

the continent may he hurled against us in vain.” 142* Again and again, he
urged that the spirit of the people should he sustained by every act of the
General Assembly. President Davis traveled into many camps, and his
speeches were given wide publicity. The newspapers joined in the cam
paign to encourage the public mind. Put despondency and discontent con
tinued to reign. President Davis was discontented with Congress; Con
gress was equally discontented with President Davis, and the majority of
the people continued to be dissatisfied with both.
The Battle of Gettysburg and the loss of Vicksburg seem to be turning
points in the southern morale during the war. There is no evidence that
the people believed that they were beaten from these events to the end of
the war, but there is a gradual sentiment showing a change which begins
to manifest itself. Jones, of the Surrey Light Artillery, writes that
"our losses have been great but there is yet hope for us"—a half-hearted
consolation. Jonathan Worth wrote, August, 18(in, that the war could not
last much longer. “The want of subsistence," wrote he, "and the return
ing sanity of our women will contribute much to close it. The last-dollar
and the last-man men abuse Holden's peace article, but the fact that he
has the largest and most rapidly increasing circulation of any other journal
in the state indicates the current of public opinion." (Holden's subscrip
tion list had increased
per cent.) lie expected also that the expiration
of the term of service of the men of 18(11, whose term of conscription of
three vears would expire in 18(14, would not re-enlist and that no member
of Congress would dare require a longer service. Worth concluded that
"the masses are for peace on any terms, they are determined the war
shall cease. As soon as this spirit extends from the people to the army,
the end will come.” 14:1
J. K. Jovner, a citizen of Henry Court House, Virginia, had been
traveling about the upper counties of Virginia in 18(i:i, and he found an
unfortunate state of affairs, lie stated that, in parts of Bedford, por
tions of Botetourt, Roanoke, Montgomery, Giles, Floyd, Franklin, Patrick,
Henry and portions of Pittsylvania, etc., the people seemed completely
demoralized; and this state of things exists to a great extent among the
best citizens. "They think and say that we are whipped, and are bound
to be overrun and subjugated. The impression has very extensively ob
tained that our army is disspirited and is deserting by hundreds and whole
regiments have left at a time.” I le adds, that the upper counties of North
Carolina are much worse than those that he had mentioned; “the deserters
are accumulating a vast number of muskets in all the country, and avow
that thee- shall be used against the Confederacy, if there is any attempt to
arrest them. There are hundreds of men through this country, aye, I

142 Off. Reds. Rcbcll., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 190.
14:1 Correspondence of Jonathan Worth, pp. 251, 250.
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may sav thousands, who ought to he in the service, but there is not moral
force enough in the country to bring them out.” 144145*
Desertions. The desertions are indicative also of the extent of opposi
tion to conscription, and of the lack of the will to tight. Desertions on a
large scale began in 18(1.4. General Pillow, of the Volunteer Bureau,
wrote to General Cooper, the Adjutant-General, July, 18(14, reporting that
there were 25.000 to 40,000 men liable to duty in Georgia.14-1 Many de
serters collected in the western countries of North Carolina, where senti
ment protected them. Governor Vance said that there were 50,000 to
100.000 men who in some form or other were evading duty and that there
were 40,000 or 50,000 absentees without leave in North Carolina.14"
There were S.uOO to 10,000 deserters and conscripts in the mountains of
Alabama. An officer reported that some of them had deserted the second
and the fourth time; and he asked for authority to round them up and
send them to Virginia, for they would desert if they were sent to the army
near their homes.147 II. W. Walter, a prominent citizen of Holly Springs,
Mississippi, wrote to Senator Watson, of the same state, that “the country
is infested bv deserters, robbing friend and foe indiscriminately.’’ 148 In
North Carolina, the deserters of the western counties joined with others
from Tennessee to terrorize the communities, and many acts of violence
were committed. We are told of many persons who hid in dens, caves
and other out of the way places in order to avoid conscription.1411 Judge
Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, reported that the condition in the
mountainous districts of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and
Alabama menaced the existence of the Confederacy "as fatally as either
of the armies of the United States."17,11 In Virginia, a secret society,
known as the Heroes of America, was organized to encourage desertion
and to spread disaffection among the people and army. Its membership
was said to he large. In Montgomery County there were 800 members,
and "adjoining counties were said to he full of these people.” 17,1
Brigadier-General Preston, of the Bureau of Conscription, estimated the
number of deserters in March, 1805, as 100,000.172 The Charleston
Mercury, quoting the same figures, said that there is a corp of troops of
21.000 on the rolls, which did not turn out 1,000 effective men.173 General
Johnston, in his Memoirs, mentions the great difficulty of securing effective
144 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV. Vol. II, pp. 721-72:1.
145 Ibid., pp. 081.
14,: Ibid., pp. 074.
147 Ibid., pp.. 080.
148 Publications, Mississippi Historical Society, Centenary Ser. II, pp. 211, 212.
I4-' hast Ninety Days, pp. 2411.
'""O ff. Reds. Rebell, Ser. IV, II, 780.
J-'1 Ibid.. Ser. IV, Vol. HI. pp. 840.
17,2 Jones, Surrey Light Artillery, pp. 4.'!!).
lr'3 Quoted by The Portfolio. Columbia, (S. C.) Weekly, January 31, 1807>.
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men for fighting purposes. Vice-President Stephens, in an address before
the Legislature of Georgia in 1801, declared the whole system of con
scription wrong and wholly unconstitutional. In North Carolina, the
opposition was more bitter. Public meetings were held and protests were
drawn against the arbitrary conscription policy of the government. In
many localities in North Carolina the deserters formed the majority and
"the stigma attached to desertion was rapidly lost.” 134*137
Rich Man's IVar. The exemption of slave-owners and overseers led
to much discontent. The cry was raised that the war was a “Rich Man’s
War" and a “ Poor Man’s Fight.” General Ruggles, of Mississippi, wrote
in 1863 that “the people assume that if the more wealthy portion of our
population, the slave-holders, will not enter the ranks to defend their
property, it was not incumbent on those who had no such large interest at
stake. The argument received greater force by the number of substitutes
employed by the more wealthy.” He concluded that “unless something
is done to correct this growing spirit of discontent, we shall cease to have
that cordial support of the citizens who constitute a majority of our
fighting forces.” 155 The situation in North Carolina in 18(13 was de
scribed as “a sense of insecurity which presages an appeal to arms, and
the root of the whole matter was a deadly hostility to our cause and our
Government.” It was in this year that Vance and Holden parted com
pany. Vance had been brought forward as gubernatorial candidate in
18(12, and in 1863 the split came over the issue of the peace meetings.
Governor Vance continuing to work for the southern cause and Holden
for peace. Senator Phelan of Mississippi wrote to President Davis, stating
that “never did a law meet with more universal odium than the exemption
of slave-owners. Its gross injustice is denounced even by those whose
position enables them to take advantage of its privileges * * * its
influence upon the poor is most calamitous and has awakened a spirit and
elicited a discussion of which we may safely predict unfortunate results.” 130
Deaths. As the summer of 1863 passed, the death lists grew larger.
Hardly a household was omitted from the lists. In the North, where there
were many families untouched, the situation was different. One writer, in
1863, is forced to cry out, "Our fallen braves how numerous! Among our
generals, Zollicoffer, Ben. McCulloh, Albert Sydney Johnson and the
saintly, dauntless Stonewall Jackson, are numbered among the dead; while
scarcely a household in our land does not mourn the loss of a brave husband
and father, son or brother.” 157 Deaths, military defeats, invasions,
destructions of property may cause a great deal of suffering, but as
Alexander Stephens said before the Georgia Legislature in 1864, “They
134 Last Ninety Days of W ar in North Carolina, pp. 214.
ir,r>Publications. Mississippi Historical Society, Centenary Ser. II, 181.
lr,l! Ibid., pp. 182.
137 Life in Dixie, Gay, pp. 21-22.

http://dh.howard.edu/hush/vol2/iss1/3

36

Wesley: The Collapse of the Confederacy

m

H oward U niversity R ecord

can do but little toward conquering a people who are determined never to
submit." 1''' Hut were the southern people determined? Were they willing
to pay the price of independence? Independence and liberty could be
gathered only of blood and misery sustained by a devoted patriotism.
(Governor Vance doubted that they had the willingness to pay the price,
hut he was determined that "in the tracing of the sad story of the backing
down, the self-imposed degradation of a great people, the historian shall
not say it was due to the weakness of their Governor, and that Saul was
consenting unto their death.” 1"’” In Mississippi, by .March, 18<>1, many
who had been bitter secessionists were ready and anxious for peace on any
terms.1”" Many were willing to leave the Confederacy for the North.
This sentiment is expressed by Mrs. Dawson in a Confederate G irl’s
Diary, when she paraphrases Hamlet, “To be or not to be. that's the
question. Whether 'tis nobler in the Confederacy to suffer the pangs of
an unappeasable hunger and never-ending trouble, or to take passage to a
Yankee port, and there remaining end them.”
Sentiment. The last six months of the Confederacy were months of
sham. In May, 1801, General Sherman left Chattanooga for Georgia.
Governor Brown issued a series of appeals to Georgians to arise and repel
the invaders. They were urged to come in squads or singly, to bring such
weapons as they could find and to bushwhack the invaders without mercy.1,11
Senator Hill of Georgia issued the following appeal: "Every citizen with
his gun, and every Negro with his spade and axe, can do the work.
Georgians, be firm, act promptly and fear not.” The delegation from
Georgia in the Confederate House sent the following message: "Let every
man fly to arms—remove provisions and Negroes. Burn all bridges and
block up the road in his route. Assail the invader by day and night—let
him have no rest." General Beauregard also sought to arouse the state
to its danger. Said he, "Arise for the defense of our native soil! O b
struct and destroy all roads in Sherman's front, flank and rear, and his
army will soon starve in your midst." 1,12 The Richmond Dispatch reported
the response to these appeals. It stated that the planters stayed at home,
awaiting the invaders' approach, “nor did they destroy any property or
drive away their cattle." It concluded that there was but one interpreta
tion, that "confidence in the success of the rebellion no longer exists anvwhere outside of the official class and the army.” 1,12 Senator Foote, w rit
ing early in 1S(5. stated that by December, 18(14, "to all men in Richmond,
the collapse of the Confederate cause appeared inevitable.” Mrs. Chesnut
l:^ Cleveland, A. H. Stephens, pp. IT.").

1",n hast Ninety Days, pp. 125-120.
Ili" Publications, Miss. Historical Soc., Cell. Ser. II, pp. 212.

1.11 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. I. Vol. I J I . pt. 2. pp. 073-074.
1.12 Charleston Mercury, November 22. 1S04.
■ '•"Richmond Dispatch. February 14, 1805.
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wrote in September. 1S(il, that the end had come—"since Atlanta fell, I
have felt as if all were dead within me forever."
De Leon wrote in
Four Years in Rebel Capitals that the fall of Atlanta was a terrible shock
to the people of the South. "A sullen and increasing gloom," said he,
"seemed to settle over the majority of the people.’’ Governor Vance was
distressed bv the situation, as he wrote to a friend, September 2'2, 18(> 1,
"The signs which discourage me more than aught else are the utter de
moralization of the people. With a base of communication five hundred
miles in Sherman's rear, through our own country, not a bridge has been
burned, not a car thrown from its track, not a man shot by the people
whose country he has desolated. They seem everywhere to submit when
our armies are withdrawn. What does this show, my dear sir? It shows
what 1 have always believed, that the great popular heart is not now and
never has been in this war. It was a revolution of the politicians, not
the people ; and was fought at first by the natural enthusiasm of our young
men, and has been kept going by state and sectional pride, assisted by that
bitterness of feeling produced by the cruelties and brutalities of the
enemy." 1115
The newspapers, churches and public officers attempted to bolster up
the failing morale. The Richmond Dispatch urged that "we hear no
more cries of peace, but let every man make up his mind to war. We have
hitherto been extremely averse to regard the war as anything more than a
sort of episode in our existence * * * we must give up money-making
and devote ourselves to the pursuits that will assist in carrying on the
war.’’ 1110 After a church service in November, 1S(; 1, Mrs. Chesnut com
mented in her diary, "What a sermon !—there was more exhortation to
light and die, a la Joshua, than much Christianity.” 11,7 In Mississippi, it
was said that the summons of brave leaders and patriotic appeals to battle
had become as idle as the call of spirits from the vast deep. It was found
that only in the ranks of the army did constancy and fidelity linger. With
the people the source of sustenance was being gradually limited, the force
of resistance had run out, and only the shell was left to offer a short
prolongation of what was known to be a futile combat.
George Eggleston, a Confederate private, states that it was impossible
to tell precisely when the conviction became general in the South that they
were beaten, and yet, he says, "from the beginning of the campaign of
18(i I, we must have known that the end was approaching and that it could
not be other than disastrous." ",s Another declares that the generals at
104 Chesnut, pp. 327.
Last Ninety Days, pp. 27-28.
111,1 Richmond Dispatch, October 18, 1864.
1117 Chesnut, pp. 334.
lliS Eggleston, pp. 235.
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the head of the Southern armies had resigned all hopes of success after the
campaign of 1Slid had opened.11'” Jones, the W ar Clerk, wrote that in
Richmond, December, 18(i 1, there was deep vexation, “a general appre
hension that our affairs are rapidly approaching a crisis such as has not
been experienced before * * * men are silent and some are dejected,
and it is unquestionably the darkest period we have yet experienced.” 170
Judge Hudson, of Leake County, Mississippi, wrote to President Davis,
November, 1861, that in his state there was a general discontent and "a loss
of confidence in the administration and our success, a disposition of opposi
tion to the powers that be and declarations of reconstruction.” 171 But
President Davis and the civil officials were as defiant as ever. In ad
dressing Congress, Mr. Davis said that the Confederacy had no vital
points. “ If Richmond, Wilmington and Charleston, and Savannah and
Mobile were all captured,” said he, “the Confederacy would remain as
defiant as ever, and no peace would be made which did not recognize its
independence.” 173
As 1805 opened, among many of the people there was an absence of
the enthusiasm of 1801. At Salisbury and Charlotte, North Carolina,
there were two destructive fires which consumed great quantities of stores,
and there was a great freshet on January 10, which carried away bridges,
mills, fences and tore up railroads all through the central part of the state.
Mrs. Spencer, in the Last Ninety Days of the War, declared that these
happenings added to the general gloom and repression, and “that the very
elements seemed to have enlisted against us.” 173 From Georgia, Howell
Cobb wrote that "gloom and despondency rule the hour and bitter opposi
tion to the administration mingled with dissatisfaction and disloyalty is
manifesting itself.” 174 A correspondent of the Richmond Dispatch, in
January, 1805, told of the contract in Charleston between 1801 and 18G5;
that those who were the most furious advocates of secession in 18G0, as
well as many of the most confident and resolute supporters of the cause
were now the most despondent; that the city which had been “the cradle
of rebellion and the hot-bed of secession no longer presented the bold front
with which it entered the conflict and the men who would not stop to count
the cost four years ago, and who inaugurated the secession movement,
now hint at another revolution.” 173
January 21, 1865, Thomas Bocock wrote to President Davis that there
was a rapid change for worse in the public sentiment of the country,
lliu Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, pp. 197.
1711Jones, Diary of War Clerk, II, pp. 3C8.
171 Publications, Mississippi Historical Society, Cen. Ser. II, pp. 212.
172 Pollard, Last Year of War, 117.

17:l Last Ninety Days, 29.
174 Southwest Historical Quarterly, Vol. 19, 229. Jones, II, 393.
175 Richmond Dispatch, January 20, 1805.
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“not only in other states, but here in our loved and honored Virginia;”
and he urged that something should lie done "to restore confidence and
revive hopes or else we may look for the worse results." The Confederacy
from this period on was slowly tottering to its fall. As one writer inter
preted the situation, “the people are not only weary of the war, hut thev
have no longer any faith in the President, his Cabinet, Congress, the
Commissaries, Quartermasters, enrolling officers and most of the generals."
Finally he is led to cry out, "God save us! We seem incapable of saving
ourselves." 170
The recorded instances which show the spirit of the southern peo
ple during these months are pathetic. They manifest a gradual
loss of faith and confidence in the future. General Lee realized the condi
tion. lie wrote to General Wise in February, 18(>5, “We have strength
enough left to win our independence, and we are certain to win it. if the
people will not give away to a foolish despair.” 177 A few (lavs before,
he had written the same sentiment to W. C. Rives. “ If the people will
sustain the soldiers and evince the same resolution as the army," he felt no
apprehension about the issue of the contest.17'' Again in March, he wrote
to Secretary Breckinridge, “Everything, in my opinion, has depended and
still depends upon the disposition and feelings of the people.” Reagan,
Postmaster-General, wrote to President Davis, April 22, 18(15, “It is also
for me to say that much as we have been exhausted in men and resources,
I am of the opinion that if our people continue the contest with the spirit
which animated them during the first years of the war, our independence
might yet he in our reach. But I see no reason to hope for that now.” 17:1
Confidence was thus rapidly passing away. “Re-establish confidence,” said
the Daily South Carolinian, a Columbia weekly, "and our greatest victory
is won.” 180
While much depended upon the people, almost as much depended upon
the army. Straggling bodies of Confederate soldiers hurried through
North Carolina and Georgia. In some of the armies discipline seemed to
have broken down. There were those who saw that subjugation of the
South would he a matter of years. The wide territory, if the soldiers
could he kept fighting, would make immediate subjugation impossible.
Warfare by detached parties who knew the country could have been car
ried on for years. Small bands of soldiers could have existed where large
armies would starve. But the will to fight was gone and the Confederacy
was staggering to its grave. Ex-Governor Graham of North Carolina
stated that he left Richmond in the evacuation movement, convinced of
I7,; Jones, II, pp. 301.
177 Richmond Dispatch, February 17, 1805.

]7'' Ibid., February 9, 1805.
,7fl Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 204.
180 Daily South Carolinian, February 12, 1805.
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three things, ( 1 ) that independence for the southern Confederacy was
perfectly hopeless, (2) that through the administration of Mr. Davis we
could expect no peace, so long as he shall he supplied with the resources
of war, and (4) “that it was the duty of the state government to immeditely move for the purpose of effecting an adjustment of the quarrel with
the United States." ,M
A few days before General Lee's surrender, April L INCA, Mrs. Andrews
wrote in her Diarv, "The war is closing in upon us from all sides. I am
afraid there are rougher times ahead than we have ever known yet." On
April IN, while in the streets, she learned of rumors of the surrender,
and she wrote, “nobody seems to doubt it. and everybody feels ready to give
up hope." When the confirmation of Lee's surrender was brought, she
described the situation in the following words: "There is a complete re
vulsion in public feeling. Xo more talk about lighting to the last ditch ;
the last ditch has already been reached; no more talk about help from
France and England, hut all about emigration to Mexico and Brazil. We
are irretrievably ruined." lsSouthcni Women. Everywhere the men lost their morale sooner than
the women. The spirit of the women is one of the marvels of the war.
When men were surrendering and advocating union, the women were
willing to light longer. No historian may chronicle the rebellion without
noticing the record of the women. I low may we explain it? 'There is
first, an inherent spirit of self-sacrifice and of continued devotion in the
feminine nature which is not common to the male. 'The devotion of
women to their country is not exceptional. It is common to every nation
and every people in their struggles for what seems to he worthy. They
have been always the silent power which ruled behind the throne. There
was nothing in the liber of southern women which would make them
inherently superior to the women of other ages and sections in the manner
in which tliev bore their privations. If the North had been called upon
to make the sacrifices which were demanded of the South, the women of
the North would have responded in as noble a manner. In the South, they
toiled and they were spinning in their homes, they were nursing in the
hospitals, and many wrote bright, cheery letters to the front, and mani
fested in the hour of trial an undaunted patriotism. It must not he for
gotten, however, that a minority differed. As we read some of the letters
and diaries, we may understand why so many men became deserters.
General Lee complained that many desertions among the North Carolina

1M hast Ninety Days. pp. 137-141.
lsa Andrews, Dairy, pp. 13:1-155. These sentiments are
sentiment of Colonel Freemantle. who wrote of his Three
States, in lst;:!, when he said in speaking of the devotion of
that the nineteenth century would not witness the destruction
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troops were occasioned by the news from home. There was another type
of Southern woman, whom we may parallel in any section and at any
period. She was attracted by the advertisements of blockade material for
sale. The columns of the newspapers are filled with ads for the attraction
of women buyers. Under such a stimulus there were some women who
never felt the privations of war.
I Iere was a group whom the ease and luxury of the slave regime had
taught to he ladies, and who with the help of the blockade and of mer
chants eager tor the sale of goods, continued to live their lives of ease
with little alteration. These were in the minority, but such a group as we
may find in any society. On the other hand there were those who suffered
and sacrificed, who offered their hair, their valuables, to be sold for the
maintenance of the Confederate finances, and when the war was over,
they were as determined as before. A correspondent of the Boston .Ad
vertiser was quoted in the Richmond Republic of July, 18(15, as saving
that the women are more hitter than the men in their feeling toward the
North. “The men are deeply mortified," he said, “hut seem for the most
part to accept their changed condition." As the historian contemplates
this situation he may he reminded of the trite adage about convincing a
woman against her will. And yet the story of the southern woman in the
war is one of the heroic narratives of this history.
The morale of the South, when the war began, was enthusiastic, and
the section was fairly united in its objects. The majority opinion was
pro-war to 4St;:;. With the defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, there
was the beginning of a change. Not an acknowledgement of defeat, but
a sullen hope that negotiations and diplomacy might win what the force
of arms had not won. The disaffection spread, as we have noted above,
through North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi,
Alabama and the lower South. The exemption of slave-owners made the
war appear as rich man’s war; the death lists, although received with
fortitude, affected the spirit of those at home; the appeals made by
governors, President Davis, Congress and public speakers were issued in
vain. Throughout 18(14, the discontent continues to spread. As 18(15
opens many contrasts in the spirit of the people in this last year and in the
first year of the war are noted by trustworthy observers. General Bee’s
letters show that he realized the importance of popular support. But the
South had lost heart, and the acknowledgement of this loss came only in
the surrender of General Lee. The army and officers must have known
that they were beaten, hut determinedly they refused to believe it. It is a
wonder that the Confederacy with this divided spirit and these disin
tegrating forces within, maintained itself as long as it did. If there is
any single personality which contributed to this dogged continuance, it
was the personality of Jefferson Davis. He refused to believe that he
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was beaten, until he was a deserted fugitive. From his mind, the hope of
the Confederacy seemed never to fade.
Abandonment of the Slavery Issue. The Confederacy prior to 1865
had been seeking either recognition or intervention from Europe. It was
thought that through the need of Europe for the cotton product of the
South, recognition or intervention would follow as a matter of course.
Hut the expected cotton famine did not develop, and no European nation
had taken up the cause of the South. The existence of the institution of
slavery was a hindrance to the spread of sympathy for the Confederacy.
This government was standing in the middle of the nineteenth century
supporting a feudal and outworn institution. While the rest of the world,
including the North, had adopted the modern industrial basis. The nine
teenth century was the century of industrial advance. Civilization was
taking a forward step, hut the South was maintaining and defending a
system which pointed backward.
The attitude of England upon this question is shown by a report of
Mason, Confederate Commissioner to England, regarding the speeches by
Earl Russell, in the House of Lords, as earlv as March, 186:>.ls:l A con
versation with Lord Donnoughmore revealed the fact that Lord Palmerston
was probably unwilling to make a treaty with the Confederacy because of
the slavery issue. Letters were sent from various sources to President
Davis and to Secretary Benjamin, stating that slavery was the great
obstacle to recognition.184
In the autumn of 1,804 Secretary Benjamin informed President Davis
that "future negotiations must he on the basis of emancipation and the
government seizure of cotton to purchase ships by which to break the
blockade." 18' It was decided to send Davis F. Kenner of Louisiana to
propose emancipation. After a series of interesting adventures he reached
England early in 1S(>5, but it was too late in the war to accomplish any
permanent result by this mission.18,1
The failure of such an effort shows how completely the southern or
ganization had collapsed. Although founded on the maintenance of slavery,
the Confederacy was now willing to abandon this institution—the corner
stone of its edifice. Thus the "benevolent” institution of slavery was
thrown into the discard in the interest of political expediency. From
1865, to the present time, loud and long have been the assertions that
"we did not go to war because of slavery”—but the facts speak for them
selves. Slavery was defended until hope was all but gone. The South
had found that it could not force its feudal principles upon the progressive18
188 Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, Callahan, pp. 242-243.
184 Ibid., pp. 244.
185 Ibid., pp. 240.
180 William and Mary College Quarterly, Vol. 25, pp. 9-12.
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nineteenth century. It was a vain attempt to lead an advancing political
and economic civilization backward.
Another reversal of form is shown in the suggestion for the arming
of the Negroes.18718 From the first year of the war, Negroes were em
ployed by the Confederates as laborers in the building and repairing of
fortifications. In 1<S(i4, the Confederate Congress passed a law for the
impressment of 20,000 slaves for menial service.188 In the meantime,
local combat units of Negroes were organized in Louisinana, South Caro
lina. Tennessee and Virginia. In New Orleans one regiment contained
l.loo free colored men. But the Confederate Government refused to
adopt this expedient. In November, 18(i4, J. A. Seddon, the Secretary of
War, refused permission to .Major Briggs of Columbia, Georgia, to raise
a regiment of Negro troops.18'1 Sentiment was being created, however,
in the interest of the arming of the Negroes. The potent argument for it
was the difficulty of securing white southerners to enlist and remain in the
army. One group of Confederates, of which General Howell Cobb was
typical, declared that “the proposition to make soldiers of our slaves is the
most pernicious idea that has been suggested since the war began. * * *
If slaves make good soldiers, our whole theory of slavery is wrong.” On
the contrary. General Pat Cleburne and Secretary Benjamin advocated
their enlistment. Sam. Clayton of Georgia, another advocate, declared
that “the recruits should come from our Negroes, nowhere else. We should
away with false pride and promptly take hold of all the means God has
placed within our reach to help us through this struggle—a war for the
right of self-government. Some people say Negroes will not fight. I say
they will fight. They fought at Ocean Pond ( Olustee, Fla.), Iloney Hill
and other places. The enemy fights us with Negroes and they will do very
well to fight the Yankees.” 180
In January, 18(>5, General Pee recommended in strong terms the employ
ment of Negroes. But Congress delayed, the Senate refusing in February
to call on the Committee on Military Affairs to report a bill. Finally after
recommendations from General Lee, Governor Smith of Virginia, the
Virginia Assembly and President Davis, an act was passed by the Con
federate Congress, March 13, 18(>5, to enroll 300,000 Negroes in the armed
forces of the Confederacy. Efforts were made to put the law into opera
tion. Recruiting officers were appointed in each state, and preparations
were made for their entrance into the army.1”1 The Richmond Dispatch,
187 For an extended discussion of this subject, see the study by the writer, “The
F.mployment of Negroes as Soldiers by the Confederacy." Journal of Negro H is
tory, Vol. IV, pp. 239-251!, July, 1919.
188 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. I ll, pp. 933.
18:1 Ibid., pp. 799.
1,111 Off. Reds. Rebell., Ser. IV, Vol. I ll, pp. 1010.
1,11Ibid., pp. 1193 and Appendix.
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March 25, 1855, in noting the accessions to the Negro regiment, remarked
that "the cause is progressing." But the Charleston Mercury concluded
more wisely, that "the experiment will simply take two hundred thousand
good muskets out of the Confederacy, two hundred thousand good corn
producers out of the held, every one of whom is needed, and will place
two hundred thousand Negro troops already armed and drilled in the
Yankee army."
The adoption of this project for the use of Negroes as soldiers shows
the complete extent of the collapse. The heart of the South was no longer
in its struggle. Intent on winning, the leaders were willing to accept any
expedient; even to reverse themselves on the theories upon which the
Confederate Government had predicated its existence. Moreover, un
willing to tight themselves—for there were thousands of deserters in the
South—they would now thrust their slaves to the front to tight for them.
Since the Civil War, southern writers and sympathizers have been de
claring that the causes of the Confederate failure in its war for inde
pendence were the overwhelming numbers in northern armies, the scarcity
of food, men, materials, the blockade or the errors of its leadership. It
would seem that the truth as revealed by the facts should now he known
without fear of sectional animosity. Leaving aside military defeats, the
collapse of the South was due in part to a lack of resources, but more
directly to a lack of a wholehearted and sustained resistance, a complete
renunciation of self, an unqualified support of its government’s measures,
a devoted and continued loyalty to its declared principles, without which
no revolution has been successful. The Confederacy's championship of a
cause and a system which was outworn was also a powerful element in its
fall. The Industrial Revolution in Europe had proclaimed a new economic
system, which was making a rapid advance in America. The political
revolutions of 1818, although unsuccessful, had been pointing to a forward
movement in the political freedom of the working man. The Confederacy,
surrounded by destructive forces, working without and within, met the
only climax which was humanly possible for it. Pressed by a mightier
military opponent, discounted by foreign powers and overwhelmed by its
own weaknesses, the Confederacy passed away.
No single factor which has been noted above may explain—by itself—
the collapse of the Confederacy. Each one is contributory to the result.
It has been shown,
(1) That the resources of the Confederacy were sufficient for its neces
sary demands, but that these resources were either inadequately distributed
or that they were interfered with by advancing Federal troops—a superior
military organization. This apparent lack of resources contributed to the
collapse, hut the claims of some writers that these were the great causes
of the Confederate collapse must he revised;
(2) That the lack of a co-operative endeavor between the President,
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(. abinet, Congress and state leaders contributed to the decline of the popular
support of the war; and
(•'1 That the morale of the Confederacy, from the autumn of 1864, was
steadily declining. In spite of the appeals of the Confederate leaders, the
popular support of the war decreased. General Lee realized the signifi
cance of this loss, but the great heart of the South with the opening of
1865 was no longer in the struggle. Of the factors contributing to the
collapse, the psychological factor of morale was one of the most influ
ential. In the interest of historical truth, these factors must be considered.
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